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Comment
DUI as a Crime of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. §
16(b); Does a Drunk Driver Risk "Using" Force?
Michael G. Salemi*

I. INTRODUCTION

Courts and commentators agree that driving under the influence
("DUI")' of alcohol is a serious offense that wreaks a huge toll on
society in the form of loss of life, physical injury, and property
damage. 2 Each year, drunk drivers cause over twenty-five thousand
deaths, one million personal injuries, and more than five billion dollars
in property damage. 3 Residents of the United States commit the offense
of DUI more frequently than almost any other offense. 4 In 2000 alone,
approximately 9.8 million people were arrested for DUI. 5 In response
to the threat that driving under the influence of alcohol poses,
states
6
have increased the penalties for DUI in the last twenty years.
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1. This Comment will refer to the offense of drunken driving generically as "DUI" although
many states refer to the offense by other names, such as "driving while intoxicated" or "driving
while ability impaired." See ROBERT S. REIFF, DRUNK DRIVING AND RELATED VEHICULAR
OFFENSES I (2d ed. 1999).
2. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257
F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing drunk driving as "reprehensible conduct" that presents
"an urgent, nationwide problem of staggering proportion"); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d
370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Drunk driving, by its nature, presents a serious risk of physical
injury.").
3. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (citing 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(d), at 71 (2d ed. 1987)).
4. LAWRENCE TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 1.0 (5th ed. 2000).
5. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 211 tbl. 345
(120th ed. 2000).
6. See generally REIFF, supra note 1, at 1-2 (discussing increased penalties for DUI).
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In order to convict for DUI, a state must prove that a defendant
operated a motor vehicle upon a roadway within the jurisdiction of the
court, and that the operation occurred while the defendant was either
under the influence of intoxicants or driving with a blood alcohol
concentration above the legal limit. 7 Generally, DUI is a strict liability
offense. 8 That is, the state need not prove that the offender intentionally
or recklessly drove under the influence. 9 In addition, DUI is usually a
misdemeanor, but it can be a felony when the offender causes personal
10
injury to another or where the offender has prior DUI convictions.
To say that DUI is a serious offense, however, does not necessarily
11
mean that it is a crime of violence as defined by federal law.
Congress has defined a "crime of violence" as any felony offense "that,
by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense."' 12 The United States Supreme Court has not defined the
exact scope of the definition of crime of violence, but has noted that the
definition is broad. 13 Section 16(b) serves as the definition of crime of

7. REIFF, supra note 1, § 2-1, at 6-8.
8. See, e.g., Brewer v. Kimel, 256 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2001) (DUI "is a strict liability
offense; one is guilty simply by virtue of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level
higher than the legal limit, and there is no requirement that the state prove any mens rea as to
intoxication as an element of the offense."); State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 563 (Fla. 1999)
(stating that the state need not prove negligence to prove the offense of DUI manslaughter);
REIFF, supra note 1, § 2-1, at 8 (noting that in jurisdictions that define DUI as "driving with a
blood or breath alcohol concentration above a prohibited level ....DUI is tantamount to a strict
liability offense"); LAWRENCE TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 1.0 (4th ed. 1998) (noting
that DUI is "an absolute liability offense," and that the state need not prove "the intent to become
intoxicated [or] the intent to operate a motor vehicle"); cf 1 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., DEFENSE
OF SPEEDING, RECKLESS DRIVING & VEHICULAR HOMICIDE § 1.06 (1992) (noting that
"[s]peeding offenses are offenses of strict liability under which the element of criminal intent or
scienter is irrelevant").
9. See REIFF, supra note 1, § 2-1, at 8; TAYLOR, supra note 8, § 1.0.
10. 1 JOHN A. TARANTINO, DEFENDING DRINKING DRIVERS §§ 151, 151.2, 151.3 (2d ed.
1986).
11. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that DUI should not be
"shoehorn[ed] ...into criminal statutes that were not designed to hold it").
12. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000). Section 16 provides, in its entirety:
The term "crime of violence" means
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.
Id.
13. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 n.4 (2001) (noting that the term "aggravated felony"
has consistently been defined expansively and was broadened significantly by the Illegal
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violence for all of Title 18 of the United States Code. 14 As a result,
whether DUI is a "crime of violence" under § 16 could have a
significant impact on many areas of federal criminal law. 15 In addition,
whether DUI is a "crime of violence" has a significant impact on the
nation's immigration laws because aliens can be removed from the
United States for committing a crime of violence. 16 Finally, the
definition of crime of violence under § 16 is similar or identical to the
definitions of crime of violence used in other statutes. 17 Whether DUI
is a crime of violence under § 16(b) could impact the interpretation of
these other definitions because courts generally interpret these alternate
definitions in the same way they interpret § 16.18

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act); see infra note 50 (noting crimes of
violence are included in the definition of aggravated felony).
14. United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1311 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that assisting or
instigating the escape or attempted rescue of a prisoner is a crime of violence under § 16(b)).
15. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 929(a)(1) (2000) (criminalizing possession of restricted ammunition
in commission of a crime of violence); 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) (2000) (criminalizing the use of
interstate travel, commerce, or mail with intent to commit a crime of violence); 18 U.S.C. §
1959(a)(4) (2000) (criminalizing threats, attempts, or conspiracies to commit a crime of violence
in aid of racketeering activity); 18 U.S.C. § 3521(a)(1) (2000) (providing witness relocation
protection when a crime of violence is directed at a witness); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i)
(2000) (providing mandatory restitution to victims of certain crimes, including crimes of
violence); 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000) (discussing juvenile delinquency proceedings and transfer for
criminal prosecution); 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (2000) (allowing preparation and use of juvenile records
where the act committed, if it had been committed by an adult, would be a felony and a crime of
violence). In addition, Congress has used the definition of crime of violence as found in § 16 of
Title 18 in many other Titles. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1245(b) (2000) (discussing the use of
ballistic knife in commission of crime of violence); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6) (2000) (allowing a
postsecondary education institution to disclose results of disciplinary hearing of an alleged
perpetrator to the victim of a crime of violence); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(7)(A) (2000) (providing
penalty for use of controlled substance with intent to commit crime of violence); 25 U.S.C.A. §
3207(b) (West 2001) (discussing Indian child protection); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(h), (i), (j) (1994 &
Supp. 1999) (describing the duties of the United States Sentencing Commission); 40 U.S.C. §
212a (1994) (addressing the authority of Capitol Police to make arrests for crimes of violence).
Many of these citations are collected in In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801, 803-06 (B.I.A.
1994).
16. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing the impact that § 16's definition
of crime of violence has on immigration law).
17. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (2000) (defining the term "crime of violence" for the
purpose of crimes involving firearms); 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (2000) (defining crime of violence
for the purposes of the Bail Reform Act); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)(A), 3143(b)(2) (2000)
(indicating the effect of crime of violence as defined under § 3156(a)(4) in determining pre-trial
detention and detention pending appeal or sentence respectively).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Patino, 962 F.2d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding analysis of 18
U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) "dispositive" of analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)); United States v.
Sloan, 820 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (equating § 16 with 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4));
United States v. Marzullo, 780 F. Supp. 658, 661 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (concluding that Congress
meant for the definitions of crime of violence in § 16 and 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) to mean the
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Currently, the United States Courts of Appeals are split as to whether
DUI is a crime of violence as defined by § 16(b). 19 The Second, Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held that DUI is not a crime of violence
under § 16(b). 20 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, held that DUI is
a crime of violence under § 16(b). 2 1 In addition, the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") 22 ruled that a conviction for DUI is a
conviction of a crime of violence under § 16(b).2 3

same thing); United States v. Clark, 773 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (applying analysis
of § 16(b) to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)).
19. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging the split).
20. See id. at 1144-46 (holding that DUI with injury to another is not a crime of violence
under § 16); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that DUI is not a
crime of violence under § 16); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that DUI and homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle are not crimes of violence under § 16);
United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that DUI is not
a conviction of a crime of violence under § 16), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). In
addition, the Third Circuit, in dicta, has suggested that it would also hold that DUI is not a crime
of violence under § 16. See United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992)
(suggesting, in dicta, that a conviction for driving under the influence would not be a conviction
of a crime of violence under § 16).
21. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an Idaho
conviction for DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b)). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held
that DUI with serious bodily injury is a crime of violence under § 16(a). Le v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
196 F.3d 1352, 1354 (1 th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that a Florida conviction for driving
under the influence with serious bodily injury is a crime of violence under § 16(a)). This
Comment will focus only on whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b). The Eleventh
Circuit is the only court to hold that a DUI-related offense is a crime of violence under § 16(a).
See id. In Le, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination
that DUI with serious bodily injury is a crime of violence under § 16(a) is a reasonable
interpretation of that statute. Id. at 1353-54. In one short paragraph, the court analyzed the
offense at issue and noted that serious bodily injury is an element of the offense. Id. at 1354. The
court then concluded that DUI with serious bodily injury is a crime of violence under § 16(a)
because an element of the offense includes the actual use of physical force. Id. The court did not
decide whether DUI with serious bodily injury would be a crime of violence under § 16(b). See
id.
No other court or agency followed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Le. See Bazan-Reyes, 256
F.3d at 609 (holding that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(a)); Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d
at 924 (implicitly holding that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(a)); In re MagallanesGarcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90 219 200, slip op. at 4 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiafbia/DecisionslRevdec/pdfDEC/3341.pdf (holding
that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(a)).
22. See infra note 65 (discussing the BIA and its powers and duties).
23. See generally In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517, slip op.
at 14-15 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 1999), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoialbia/Decisions/
Revdec/pdfDEC/3412.pdf; In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 6.
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Part II of this Comment begins with a discussion of the legislative
history of the term "crime of violence." 24 It then briefly explains the
relationship between § 16's definition of crime of violence and the
definition of crime of violence contained in the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Sentencing Guidelines").25 Part II
concludes with a discussion of how § 16(b)'s definition of crime of
violence impacts the nation's immigration laws and the approach that
the BIA has taken in determining whether DUI is a crime of violence
under § 16(b).2 6 Part III canvasses the current split among the Courts of
Appeals, as well as the different approaches each Circuit has taken in
determining whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b). 27 Part
IV of this Comment analyzes the opinions focusing on whether DUI
poses a risk that the drunk driver will use force in the course of
committing the offense, as § 16(b) requires. 28 Finally, Part V of this
Comment proposes that the split among the Courts of Appeals should be
resolved by the United States Supreme Court or through both
congressional amendments to § 16(b) and the acquiescence of the
29
BIA.
II.BACKGROUND
The history and background of the statutory definition of crime of
violence is necessary for an understanding of the current split among the
Courts of Appeals over whether DUI is a crime of violence under §
16(b). 30 The legislative history of the definition of crime of violence
suggests that Congress intended the term to cover violent offenses and
those offenses that present a risk that an offender will use force in the
course of committing the crime. 3 1 In addition, an understanding of the
definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines is
important because many of the courts involved in the current split have
24. See infra Part II.A (describing the legislative history of the definition of crime of
violence).
25. See infra Part II.B (describing the evolution of the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of
crime of violence and its relation to § 16(b)'s definition).
26. See infra Part H.C (describing the impact that § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence has
on the nation's immigration laws).
27. See infra Part III (describing the current split among the Courts of Appeals).
28. See infra Part IV (analyzing the circuit split and arguing that DUI is not a crime of
violence under § 16(b)).
29. See infra Part V (proposing that the Tenth Circuit revisit the issue of whether DUI is a
crime of violence under § 16(b)).
30. See infra Part II.A (describing the legislative history of the definition of crime of
violence).
31. See infra Part II.A (discussing the evolution of the term "crime of violence").
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contrasted the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of violence
with § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence. 32 Finally, the
implementation of the nation's immigration laws has affected the
interpretation of the definition of crime of violence under § 16(b). 3 In
order to better understand the current split among the Courts of
Appeals, it is helpful to discuss the nation's immigration laws, as well
as opinions of the BIA, which have held that DUI is a crime of violence
under § 16(b). 34
A. The Types of Offenses Congress Intended Crime
of Violence to Include
The legislative history of the term "crime of violence" suggests that
Congress intended § 16 to cover violent offenses, such as rape and
murder, 35 as well as offenses that, by their nature, 36 pose a risk that the
offender will intentionally use force against the person or property of
32. See infra Part II.B (discussing the definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing
Guidelines).
33. See infra Part II.C.I (discussing the impact of § 16(b) on the nation's immigration laws).
34. See infra Part II.C.2 (analyzing BIA precedent holding that DUI is a crime of violence
under § 16(b)).
35. See Karen Crawford & Thomas Hutchins, Ignoring Congress: The Board of Immigration
Appeals and Crimes of Violence in Puente and Magallanes, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 67
(2001) (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 19-20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 320203).
36. Section 16(b) directs a court to determine whether an offense, "by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000). When determining whether an
offense is a crime of violence under § 16(b), courts generally use the "categorical approach,"
inquiring only into the intrinsic nature of the crime rather than into the specific facts surrounding
the commission of the offense. United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1312 (4th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the categorical approach and citing cases using the categorical approach). The phrase
"by its nature" requires a court to use the categorical approach to determine whether an offense
meets § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence. United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418,
420-21 (5th Cir. 1996) "[E]ither a crime is violent 'by its nature' or it is not. It cannot be a crime
of violence 'by its nature' in some cases, but not others, depending on the circumstances." Id.
The categorical approach of statutory interpretation focuses on the "inherent potential for risk of
physical force" in committing the offense rather than on any actual harm caused by the alien
during the commission of the underlying offense. See In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801, 809
(B.I.A. 1994) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542 (11 th Cir. 1990) interpreting
§ 16(b) for the purposes of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 prior to the November
1989 amendments). When using the categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a
crime of violence under § 16(b), courts inquire only into whether the offense is a felony that
creates a substantial risk of the possible use of physical force. Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1313. Courts
generally do not look into the underlying facts of the offense, and it does not matter whether the
risk of the use of force matured into actual use of force. See In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. at
809. Under the categorical approach, an offense is a crime of violence if the minimum conduct
necessary to sustain a conviction presents a risk of the use of physical force. Dalton v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 2001).
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another. 37 Congress enacted § 16's definition of crime of violence as a
part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 ("CCCA"). 38 A
Senate Report that accompanied an early version of the CCCA stated
that crimes of violence covered the same types of offenses described in
a District of Columbia statute. 31 Specifically, the legislative history of
the District of Columbia statute described crimes of violence as violent
offenses such as murder, rape, and voluntary manslaughter. 40 Although
37. See DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES §
7:28, at 7-100n.34 (2001) (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 307 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486-87).
38. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. X, part A, §
1001(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 2136 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000)).
39. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 20-21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3203-04 (citing
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1322(a), 23-1331(3), and 23-1331(4)); Crawford & Hutchins, supra note
35, at 70 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 19-20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3202-03). Senate Report 98-225 stated that "the offenses set forth in [what was to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l)(A) through (C)] are crimes of violence .... [and] are essentially the same
categories of offenses described in the [District of Columbia Code] by the terms 'dangerous
crime' and 'crime of violence."' S. REP. No. 98-225, at 20-21 (1994) (citing D.C. CODE ANN. §§
23-1322(a), 23-1331(3), and 23-1331(4)). For the complete definition of crime of violence under
the District of Columbia Code Annotated, see infra note 40.
The offenses set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l)(A) through (C) are as follows:
(A) a crime of violence;
(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death;
(C) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.) ....
Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. I, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 1979
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)(A)-3142(f)(l)(C) (2000)).
Senate Report 98-225 also stated that the "term 'crime of violence' is defined in [18 U.S.C. §
3156], as amended by this title." S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3202. The definition of crime of violence set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) is identical to
the definition of crime of violence set forth in § 16. Compare Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, Title II, ch. I, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 1979 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
3142(f)(l)(A)-3142(f)(l)(C) (2000)), with Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, Title II, ch. X, part A, § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 2136 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 16
(2000)).
40. See Crawford & Hutchins, supra note 35, at 69. In 1970, Congress enacted a different
definition of crime of violence as a part of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-358, Title II, § 210(a), 84 Stat. 473 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 551, 764
(codified as amended D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1331 (2001)). The District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 provided that:
The term 'crime of violence' means murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a
female under the age of sixteen, taking or attempting to take immoral, improper, or
indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen years, mayhem, kidnapping,
robbery, burglary, voluntary manslaughter, extortion or blackmail accompanied by
threats of violence, arson, assault with intent to commit any offense, assault with a
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not conclusive, these references in the legislative history of the CCCA
suggest that Congress intended § 16's definition of crime of violence to
cover offenses that are of a different nature than DUI. 4 1
The inclusion of burglary as an example of a crime of violence under
§ 16(b) is significant because several courts have compared the offense
of burglary with DUI in order to determine whether DUI is a crime of
violence under § 16(b).4 2 The legislative history states that offenses,

dangerous weapon, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
offenses, as defined by any Act of Congress or any State law, if the offense is
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
Id.
41. See Crawford & Hutchins, supra note 35, at 70. For a review of several cases determining
whether offenses are crimes of violence under § 16(b), see Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1311 (holding
that an attempt to rescue or assist a prisoner to escape is a crime of violence under § 16(b) for
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1952); United States v. Patino, 962 F.2d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating
that kidnapping is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) and that conspiracy to
commit kidnapping qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)); United
States v. Wilson, 951 F.2d 586, 587-88 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that robbery is a crime of
violence under § 16(a) as incorporated by the Sentencing Guidelines prior to the November 1989
amendments); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 548-49 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding
that robbery is a crime of violence under § 16(a) and § 16(b) and that burglary is a crime of
violence under § 16(b) for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines prior to the November 1989
amendments); United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922, 923 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that burglary of a
habitation is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines prior to the November 1989
amendments); United States v. Diaz, 778 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that narcotics
offenses are not crimes of violence under § 16 for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); United States
v. Marzullo, 780 F. Supp. 658, 663 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that arson is a crime of violence
against both person and property under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3156(a)(4)(A) and (B)); United States v.
Clark, 773 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (concluding that crime of extortion under color
of official right as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 195 1(a) and (b)(2) is not a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)); United States v. Saunders, 743 F. Supp. 444, 446 (E.D. Va. 1990), affid, 943
F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that rape, armed robbery, felonious assault, and unlawful
wounding are crimes of violence under § 16 for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines prior to
the November 1989 amendments); In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 807 n.5 (citing United States
v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377 (10th Cir. 1993)) (stating that rape and attempted sexual abuse of a
child are crimes of violence under § 16(b)).
42. See, e.g., Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (Walker, C.J., dissenting);
Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d
921, 926 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir.
1992)), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). The United States Supreme Court has
discussed at length the nature of the offense of burglary. See generallyTaylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575 (1990). In Taylor, the Supreme Court stated that the offense of burglary involves
danger to others because the burglar may have to use violent force in order to complete the
offense. See id. at 588. The court stated that burglary involves an
[i]nherent potential for harm to persons. The fact that an offender enters a building to
commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the
offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to investigate.
And the offender's own awareness of this possibility may mean that he is prepared to
use violence if necessary to carry out his plans or to escape.
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such as burglary, are crimes of violence under § 16(b) so long as the
offenses involve the substantial risk of physical force against the person
or against the property of another. 43 One of the dangers of the offense
of burglary is that the offender may resort to using intentional force
against another in order to complete the offense.' Some courts have
cited the offense of burglary as an example of the type of offense that §
16(b) is designed to cover. 45 These courts have held that an offender
must risk the use of intentional force in order to be found guilty of a
crime of violence under § 16(b). 4 6
Id. Some commentators have drawn on the Supreme Court's discussion regarding burglary to
See
argue that a DUI conviction should not be a crime of violence under § 16(b).
KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 37, § 7:28, at 7-100. They argue that because DUI
does not have the same mens rea as burglary, DUI cannot be a crime of violence in light of the
fact that the legislative history gave burglary as an example of an offense that would be a crime of
violence under § 16(b). See id. To commit the offense of burglary, specific intent is required.
Id.; see also infra note 46 (defining "specific intent"). Because DUI does not include specific
intent to use force, these commentators argue, DUI should not be considered a crime of violence
under § 16(b). KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 37, § 7:28, at 7-100.
43. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 307 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486-87.
44. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588; KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 37, § 7:28, at 7100.
45. See Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1313; United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Davis, 881 F.2d 973,976 (11 th Cir. 1989).
46. See Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1313; Raynor, 939 F.2d at 196; Davis, 881 F.2d at 976. Because
mens rea is frequently discussed in the decisions comprising the current split over whether DUI is
a crime of violence under § 16(b), it is useful to quickly discuss and define mens rea and the
levels of mens rea that courts generally recognize. Black's Law Dictionary defines "mens rea" as
"an element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal
intent. Guilty knowledge and willfulness." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
There is still substantial disagreement over how a court should "determine whether a particular
criminal statute requires specific intent, general intent, or strict liability." Robert Batey, Judicial
Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 341, 341-42 (2001).
Under the common law approach to defining and determining mens rea, the state must prove
that a criminal defendant possesses intent (specific or general) to perform the unlawful act, or the
defendant may be guilty under a theory of strict liability. Id. at 341. In addition, there are many
other "shades" of mens rea "along the continuum upon which these three concepts reside." Id.
"Specific intent" is "[t]he mental purpose to accomplish the specific act prohibited by the law....
[A] special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with
respect to the actus reus of the crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1399 (6th ed. 1990). For
example, at common law, the offense of larceny "requires the taking and carrying away of the
property of another, and the defendant's mental state as to this act must be established, but in
addition it must be shown that there was 'an intent to steal' the property." Id.; see also Batey,
supra, at 346 (stating that, at common law, a defendant must have an intention to steal). "General
intent," on the other hand, is defined as "the general criminal state of mind manifested by the
general conduct of the actor which constitutes a deviation from established standards of
reasonable care and which implies a certain degree of 'foreseeability' that the acts performed are
likely to produce certain harmful results." M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 3.6.2, at 179 (1978). Some courts define general intent in terms of negligence. See Batey,
supra, at 367-80 (discussing judicial attempts to define general intent). "[S]trict liability crimes"
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Finally, there is some evidence suggesting that Congress did not
intend § 16 to include DUI. 47 In 1990 and 1991, a senator proposed
legislation that would have explicitly made DUI an offense subjecting
an alien to deportation. 48 As noted below,4 9 an alien convicted of a

are "[u]nlawful acts whose elements do not contain the need for criminal intent or mens rea."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990). That is, the state need not prove any mens rea
with respect to the commission of the offense. See Brewer v. Kimel, 256 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir.
2001) (stating that DUI "is a strict liability offense; one is guilty simply by virtue of operating a
motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level higher than the legal limit, and there is no requirement
that the state prove any mens rea as to intoxication as an element of the offense"); see also supra
note 8 and accompanying text (noting that DUI may be a strict liability offense).
Some jurisdictions have adopted the approach of the Model Penal Code, a project of the
American Law Institute, which has influenced courts as well as legislatures. 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.1 (b) (1986). The Model
Penal Code recognizes five levels of mens rea: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence,
and strict liability. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02, 2.03 (official draft and revised comments
1985); Batey, supra, at 341. Under the Model Penal Code,
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of
such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a). Under the Model Penal Code, a person acts "knowingly"
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he
is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Id. at § 2.02(2)(b). The Model Penal Code defines "recklessly" as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id. at § 2.02(2)(c). Finally, the Model Penal Code defines "negligently" as follows:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
id. at § 2.02(d).
47. See Crawford & Hutchins, supra note 35, at 75-76.
48. See id. Senate Bill 3230, introduced on October 22, 1990, would have amended the
Immigration and Naturalization Act by making deportable any alien who had been convicted of
DUI with serious bodily injury or in connection with a fatal traffic accident. See id.; see also 136
CONG. REC. S16467-68 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pell); 137 CONG. REC. S7028
(daily ed. June 4, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pell).
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crime of violence is removable for having committed an aggravated
felony. 50 Both pieces of legislation were based on one senator's belief
that aliens convicted of felony DUI could not be deported.5 ' The
senator stated that it was his understanding that aliens convicted of
felony DUI were not deportable for having committed a crime of "moral
turpitude."5 2 If Congress understood § 16 to include the offense of
53
DUI, then the proposed legislation would have been redundant.
B. The Definition of Crime of Violence Under
the Sentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of violence can be
relevant to determining the meaning of crime of violence under § 16
because courts have compared and contrasted the two definitions when
interpreting one definition or the other. 54 Congress created the
Sentencing Commission as a part of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.55 Congress then directed the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate guidelines to assure that defendants convicted of crimes of
violence, among other offenses, received a sentence at or near the
maximum term. 56 Congress did not define crime of violence in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, but courts generally held that § 16's

49. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing removal of aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies, including crimes of violence under § 16).
50. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(F) (2000) (including a crime of violence under § 16 in the
definition of "aggravated felony"); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000) (subjecting alien to removal for
commission of an aggravated felony).
51. See 137 CONG. REC. S7028 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pell); 136 CONG.
REc. S 16467-68 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pell).
52. See 137 CONG. REc. S7028 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pell); 136 CONG.
REC. S16467-68 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pell). An alien who commits a
crime of moral turpitude is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
53. See Crawford & Hutchins, supra note 35, at 75-76. Congress did not pass the proposed
legislation. Id.
54. See, e.g., Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2001); Tapia Garcia v. INS,
237 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 863-66 (3d Cir.
1992).
55. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat.
1987, 2017-26. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was Chapter II of the CCCA, the same Act
that defined crime of violence under § 16. For a general discussion of the United States
Sentencing Commission and its duties, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-69
(1989). In Mistretta, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Commission and
the Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional and are neither excessive delegations of legislative
power nor violations of the separation of powers principle. Id. at 412.
56. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 376 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994)).
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definition of the term applied to the career offender statutes of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.57
On November 1, 1989, the United States Sentencing Commission
adopted a definition of crime of violence for the purposes of the
Sentencing Guidelines that differed from § 16's definition.5 8 The
Sentencing Commission stated that its revision to the definition of crime
of violence was intended only to clarify the terminology, not to
substantively change its meaning. 59
Despite the Sentencing
Commission's stated intention, courts have interpreted the two
definitions differently because of their differing language. 60 Section
16(b)'s definition of crime of violence focuses on whether there is a risk
that force will be used in the course of committing an offense. 61 In
contrast, the Sentencing Guidelines define a crime of violence in terms
of whether the offense presents a risk of injury to others. 62 Moreover, at
least one court has held that DUI is a crime of violence under the
Sentencing Guidelines' definition, while indicating, in dictum, that DUI
63
would probably not be a crime of violence under § 16(b)'s definition.

57. Parson, 955 F.2d at 864; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the
impact § 16's definition of crime of violence has on federal law).
58. Parson, 955 F.2d at 864-65. The Sentencing Guidelines defines crime of violence as:
any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year that(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.
Id. at 863 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(1)).
59. Id. at 865 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at 111). This revised
definition borrowed from the definition of "violent felony" in a federal firearms statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B). Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at 111 (2001)).
60. See, e.g., Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2001); Parson, 955 F.2d at
865.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000).
62. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.2(a) (2001).
63. Parson,955 F.2d at 874. Several courts have cited this opinion for its discussion of the
different definitions of crime of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921,
926 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at
610-11. In Parson,the Third Circuit compared the definition of crime of violence under § 16(b)
with the definition of crime of violence contained in the Sentencing Guidelines. Parson, 955 F.2d
at 863-66. The court held that DUI is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines'
definition, and suggested that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because the offender
does not intend to use physical force in order to harm others. See id. at 866.
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C. Section 16's Definition of Crime of Violence and Immigration Law
Whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16 has important
ramifications in immigration law. 64 The BIA 65 has twice considered
whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16. 66 Each time, the BIA
64. See generally Jeffrey N. Brauwerman & Stephen E. Mander, IMMACT90 Revisions
Regarding Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, FLA. BAR J., May 1992, at 28
(demonstrating the impact that a conviction for "aggravated felony" has on an alien for the
purposes of the INA). One commentator vividly described the stakes at risk in the interpretation
and implementation of deportation law:
Imagine a person who has lived in the United States since early childhood as a lawful
permanent resident, whose entire family is here, whose spouse and children are U.S.
citizens, who speaks only English and knows no other culture but ours. Such a person
can now be arrested by armed agents of the [INS], will have no right to appointed
counsel, may be subjected to mandatory detention with no right even to apply for
release on bail, and may be deported and banished forever. All this for a minor
criminal offense committed years ago, which may not even have been a ground for
deportation when it was committed and may not have been considered a conviction
under the law of the state where it occurred.
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. REV. 771,
773 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
65. The BIA is an adjudicative body that reviews decisions by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") to remove or exclude aliens. 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05 (rev. ed. 2001). The BIA derives its power from the
Attorney General of the United States. 1 Id. § 3.05[2]. The Attorney General of the United
States is primarily responsible for the nation's immigration laws. 1 Id. § 3.02[l]. The Attorney
General has broad authority to make final determinations regarding the exclusion or removal of
aliens. I Id. § 3.05[l]. This authority has largely been delegated to other agencies, such as the
INS. I Id. § 3.02[2]. The Attorney General has the power to review the removal and exclusion
determination made by the INS, but this power has, for the most part, been delegated to the BIA.
1 Id. § 3.05[2]. The BIA is almost exclusively an appellate body that reviews the initial
determinations regarding exclusion and removal. 1 Id. §§ 3.05[11]-[2]. The decisions of the BIA
are binding on the INS unless modified or overruled by the Attorney General. I Id. § 3.05[2].
The Circuit Courts of Appeals have limited jurisdiction to review a final order of removal
against an alien, including an order issued by the BIA. See infra note 70 and accompanying text
(discussing the limited power of federal courts to review final orders of removal). When the
courts review an order of removal, they will generally defer to the BIA's interpretation of the INA
if that interpretation is reasonable. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir.
2001) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The
deference owed to an agency by a reviewing court is commonly referred to as "Chevron"
deference. See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2001). When a court applies
Chevron deference, the first step is to determine de novo whether the plain language of the statute
clearly demonstrates the intent of Congress. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1220-21 (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43; Onwuneme v. INS, 67 F.3d 273, 275 (10th Cir. 1995)). If the
statute does not clearly convey the intent of Congress and is susceptible to varying interpretations
because it is ambiguous, then the second step is to determine whether the agency's interpretation
is a permissible construction of the statute. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843).
However, when the BIA is interpreting a statute other than the INA, it is not entitled to any
deference, and the courts are free to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the BIA. See
Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203; Crawford & Hutchins, supra note 35, at 78-79.
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held that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16, stating that DUI
or
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
67
property of another may be used in the commission of the offense.
1. The Impact of § 16's Definition of Crime of Violence
on Immigration Law
Whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16 is significant because
a crime of violence under § 16 is an "aggravated felony" under the
Federal Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA").6 8 An alien 69
convicted of an aggravated felony, including a crime of violence, is
subject to removal from the United States and is ineligible to seek
judicial review of a removal order. 70 In addition, an alien convicted of
66. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517, slip op. at 14-15
(B.I.A. Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/
pdfDEC/3412.pdf; In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90 219 200, slip
op. at 6-7 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/
Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf.
67. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 12. In September 1998, prompted
by the BIA's decision in In re Magallanes-Garcia, several Texas INS district offices initiated
Operation "Last Call," an effort to deport immigrants with three or more DUI convictions. See
William Branigan, INS Reviews DWI Deportations; Texas Offices' Program Angers Immigrants'
Rights Groups, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1998, at A21; Immigrants Facing Removal Through
Operation "Last Call," COMMUNIQUE, Nov. 1998, at 6. Operation "Last Call" resulted in the
arrest and removal of over 500 legal permanent residents residing in Texas. See Immigrants
Facing Removal Through Operation "Last Call," supra, at 6.
68. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(F) (2000). In 1990, Congress expanded the definition of
"aggravated felony" to include, among other things, "any crime of violence (as defined in title 18,
section 16 of the United States Code, not including a purely political offense) for which the term
of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any suspension of such imprisonment) is at least 5
years." Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)). In 1996, Congress again expanded the
definition of "aggravated felony." See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Constitutes
"AggravatedFelony" For Which Alien Can be Deported or Removed Under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), 168 A.L.R. FED. 575, 588
(2001). First, the definition of "aggravated felony" under the INA was expanded to include any
crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. See IIRIRA, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, §§ 321(a)(3), 322(a)(2)(A). This is significant in the current context of determining
whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16 because many DUI convictions carry a sentence of
at least one year. See generally JOHN H. WILLIAMSON, THE ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK ON
DRINKING DRIVING DEFENSE 324-401 (1991), 7-21 (Supp. 1993) (collecting and summarizing
DUI penalties in all fifty states). Before 1996, DUI would generally not have qualified as an
"aggravated felony" because most DUI convictions carry a sentence of less than five years. See
generally id.
69. An alien is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (2000).
70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2000) (stating that "no court shall have jurisdiction to
review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having
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unlawfully reentering the United States after removal is subject to
significant sentence enhancements if the alien was convicted of an
aggravated felony, including a crime of violence, prior to removal.7 '

committed" an aggravated felony). In 1996, Congress significantly restricted the availability of
the judicial review of final orders of removal of aliens ordered removed for having committed an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii). Sonia Chen, Comment, The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: Another CongressionalHurdle
for the Courts, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 169, 188 (2000) (citing David Cole, No Clear
Statement: An Argument for Preserving JudicialReview of Removal Decisions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 427, 429 (1998)).
Although on its face this provision seems to prevent a court from reviewing the final order of
removal of an alien found deportable for having committed an aggravated felony, courts have
uniformly retained jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction. See Park v. INS, 252 F.3d
1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also
Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203 ("We... retain jurisdiction ... to review the question whether, as a
matter of law, [the alien] committed an 'aggravated felony' under 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(43)(F) ....). Thus, the courts do review whether an offense is indeed an aggravated
felony as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). See, e.g., Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256
F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2001). The INS appears to agree that this is the correct interpretation of
the new provisions. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.2 (2001) (stating that the
scope of the preclusion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) "is not entirely clear" and noting that the
INS conceded "that the courts of appeals have the power to hear petitions challenging the factual
determinations thought to trigger the jurisdiction-stripping provision").
71. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2001).
If the alien was previously deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after a
conviction for an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(F), then the alien is
subject to an increased sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) (2001); see also United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d
921, 924 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (applying U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2),
reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). An aggravated felony includes a crime of violence
under § 16. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(F); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text
(discussing the expansion of the definition of aggravated felony to include a crime of violence
under § 16).
Several courts have determined whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16 in the course of
applying U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2. See, e.g., Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924.
Courts generally review de novo a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines. See,
e.g., United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A
court reviewing a removal order, on the other hand, will generally apply Chevron deference to the
BIA's interpretation of the INA. See, e.g., Le v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 196 F.3d 1352, 1353-54 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also supra note 65 (discussing Chevron deference).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, an alien is also subject to an increased sentence if the alien
previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after a conviction of a
crime of violence as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2(e)(l)(A)(ii) (2001). For the purposes of this section, the Guidelines define a
crime of violence as:
(I) ...an offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; and
(II) includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex
offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate
extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

Finally, an alien convicted of a "serious criminal offense," 72 which
includes a crime of violence under § 16, cannot be admitted into the
United States if he claims diplomatic immunity from prosecution for
73
that offense.
2. BIA Decisions Holding that DUI is a Crime of Violence
Under § 16(b)
The BIA has twice held that DUI is a crime of violence under §
7 5 the BIA held that a DUI
16(b). 7 4 In In re Magallanes-Garcia,
conviction while driving on a suspended license was a crime of violence
under § 16(b) because of the inherent risk of harm to others presented
7 7 the BIA clarified its
by the offense.76 In In re Puente-Salazar,
decision in In re Magallanes-Garciaby holding that DUI involves a
substantial risk that physical force may be used against the person or
property of another during the commission of the offense. 78 Both of

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2, cmt., n.l(B)(ii) (2001). Whether DUI is
included under this definition of crime of violence is beyond the scope of this Comment.
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h) (2000). Congress defined a "serious criminal offense" as:
(1) any felony;
(2) any crime of violence, as defined in section 16 of title 18 [of the United States
Code]; or
(3) any crime of reckless driving or of driving while intoxicated or under the influence
of alcohol or of prohibited substances if such crime involves personal injury to another.
Id.
73. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(E) (2000). In 1990, Congress
expanded the grounds for excluding certain aliens from entry into the United States. Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 131, 104 Stat.
15, 31-32 (1990). The legislative history of this Act states that aliens may be denied admission
into the United States where the alien has committed a serious crime in the United States, and the
adjudication of that serious crime was prevented by the exercise of diplomatic immunity from
criminal jurisdiction. H. CONF. REP. No. 101-343, at 56 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
85, 98. The definition of "serious criminal offense" may be significant for the purposes of
determining whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16 because Congress chose to expressly
include certain offenses related to DUI within the definition of "serious criminal offense." See
Crawford & Hutchins, supra note 35, at 68-72. It is possible that this illustrates that Congress
understood DUI and related offenses to be distinct from crimes of violence under § 16. See id. at
72-75.
74. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517, slip op. at 14-15
(B.I.A. Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/DecisionslRevdec/
pdfDEC/3412.pdf; In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90 219 200, slip
op. at 6-7 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/
Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf.
75. In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 1.
76. Id. slip op. at 6.
77. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 1.
78. Id. slip op. at 13-14.
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these decisions drew on a prior BIA decision, 79 which held that an
offender need not intend to use force in order to commit a crime of
violence under § 16(b). 80
a. In re Magallanes-Garcia
In In re Magallanes-Garcia,the BIA held that aggravated DUI with a
suspended license 8' is a crime of violence under § 16(b) because the

79. In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801, 813-14 (B.I.A. 1994). In In re Alcantar, the BIA held
that § 16(b) does not require specific intent to commit a violent act, but rather requires at least
reckless behavior that involves a substantial risk of physical force against another. See id. at 80809 (citing United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1987)). In In re Alcantar, the alien
had been convicted in Illinois for involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 802. The BIA reasoned that
involuntary manslaughter necessarily involves the death of another and is likely to be the result of
violence. Id. at 813.
80. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 12 (citing In re Alcantar, 20 1. &
N. Dec. at 813); In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 6 (citing In re
Alcantar, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 813).
81. The alien in In re Magallanes-Garciawas convicted under sections 28-692(A)(1) and 28697(A)(1), (D), (E), (G)(1), (H), and (I) of the Arizona Revised Statutes. In re MagallanesGarcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 2. Section 28-692(A)(1) of the Arizona Revised
Statutes provided, in relevant part:
Driving or in actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
drugs; violation; classification; definition
A. It is unlawful for any person to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle
within this state under any of the following circumstances:
1. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor, any drug, a vapor releasing
substance containing a toxic substance or any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor
releasing substances if the person is impaired to the slightest degree.
Id. slip op. at 2-3 (quoting ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(A)(1) (West 1997)). Sections 28697(A)(1), (D)(1), and (D)(2) of the Arizona Revised Statutes provided, in relevant part:
Aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs; violation; classification; penalties; notice; definition
A. A person is guilty of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs if the person does either of the following:
1. Commits a violation of § 28-692 of this section while the person's driver's license or
privilege to drive is suspended, canceled, revoked or refused, or the
person's driver's license or privilege to drive is restricted as a result of
violating § 28-692 or under § 28-694.
D. Aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs committed under:
1. Subsection A, paragraph I or 2 of this section is a class 4 felony.
2. Subsection A, paragraph 3 of this section is a class 6 felony.
Id. slip op. at 3 (quoting ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-697(A)(1), (D)(1), (D)(2) (West 1997)).
The alien in In re Magallanes-Garciahad been ordered deported by an immigration judge under
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994). Id. slip op. at 1. The alien, who represented himself pro se,
made only minimal arguments on appeal. See id. slip op. at 1-2.
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offense involves a substantial "risk of harm" to persons and property. 82
The BIA applied the "categorical approach" to determine whether or not
the alien's conviction was a crime of violence. 83 The BIA then
determined that DUI has the potential for resulting in harm and usually
involves a risk that physical force will be used against the person or
84
property of another.
In so holding, the BIA relied on Michigan Department of State Police
v. Sitz, 85 a United States Supreme Court opinion that recognized drunk

driving as a serious problem. 86 The BIA also relied on various Courts
of Appeals decisions, articulating that DUI is an offense with an
enormous potential to result in harm. 87 The BIA concluded that the
statistics and cases provided incontrovertible evidence that the offense
of DUI is inherently reckless because it exacts serious human tolls in
89
the forms of death, injury, and property damage. 88 In a key footnote,
the BIA characterized DUI as not merely malum prohibitum, but malum
9°
in se.

82. Id. slip op. at 6. The BIA also determined that the Arizona offense in question was not a
crime of violence under § 16(a) because the elements of the crime did not include "the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Id.
slip op. at 4. One commentator has suggested that the In re Magallanes-Garciadecision spurred
the INS to initiate Operation "Last Call," "under which long-time permanent residents with old
DUI convictions were targeted for deportation." Daniel M. Kowalski, A Crime of Violence:
Malum in Magallanes, FED. LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 5.
83. In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 4; see also supra note 36
(describing the categorical approach).
84. In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 4-5 (quoting In re Alcantar,
20 1. & N. Dec. at 812).
85. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990).
86. In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 5 (quoting Sitz, 496 U.S. at
451).
87. Id. slip op. at 5-6 (citing United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1008 (10th Cir.
1996); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995)). Neither of these cases
addressed whether DUI is a crime of violence under § 16. See generally Farnsworth, 92 F.3d at
1008; Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 376.
88. In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 6 (citing Rutherford, 54 F.3d
at 375-77).
89. Kowalski, supra note 82, at 5.
90. In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 6 n.2 (citing Bronson v.
Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, 1100 (D. Nev. 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Bronson v.
McKay, 870 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1989)). Offenses that are mala prohibita are "[aicts or
omissions which are made criminal by statute but which, by themselves, are not criminal."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 659 (abridged 6th ed. 1991). Offenses that are mala in se are
"[w]rongs in themselves; acts morally wrong; offenses against conscience." Id.
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b. In re Puente-Salazar

Just eighteen months after the BIA decided In re Magallanes-Garcia,
the BIA again held that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b) in In
re Puente-Salazar.9 1 The alien in In re Puente-Salazar was convicted
under Texas law for DUI. 92 He argued that the BIA improperly equated
the "potential of resulting harm" and "serious risk of physical injury"
with § 16(b)'s "substantial risk" language. 93 The alien further argued
that § 16(b)'s language requiring that force may be used in the course of
94
committing the offense requires specific intent to use such force.
91. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517 (B.I.A. Sept. 29,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3412.pdf.
Recently, the BIA stayed an order of deportation so that it could consider what effect the Fifth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001), has on the
BIA's decision in In re Puente-Salazar. See In re Herrera, 23 1. & N. Dec. 43, 44 (B.I.A. 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3445.pdf.
92. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 2-3. The immigration judge had
determined that the alien's DUI conviction was a conviction for an aggravated felony. Id. slip op.
at 3. Although it is not clear, presumably the immigration judge determined that the alien's DUI
conviction was a conviction of a crime of violence under § 16. See id. The alien was convicted
under section 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code Annotated and received a sentence enhancement
under section 49.09(b) of the Texas Penal Code Annotated. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec.
No. 3412, slip op. at 6-7 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b) (Vernon 1997)).
Section 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code Annotated provides, in relevant part:
Driving While Intoxicated
(a) A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor
vehicle in a public place.
(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c) and Section 49.09, an offense under this
section is a Class B misdemeanor, with a minimum term of confinement of 72 hours.
(c) If it is shown on the trial of an offense under this section that at the time of the
offense the person operating the motor vehicle had an open container of alcohol in the
person's immediate possession, the offense is a Class B misdemeanor, with a minimum
term of confinement of six days.
Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (Vernon 1997)). The sentence enhancement
provision of the Texas Penal Code Annotated provides, in relevant part:
Enhanced Offenses and Penalties
If it is shown on the trial of an offense under Section 49.04, 49.05, or 49.06 that the
person has previously been convicted two times of an offense relating to the operating
of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, an offense of operating an aircraft while
intoxicated, or an offense of operating a watercraft while intoxicated, the offense is a
felony of the third degree.
Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b) (Vernon 1997)).
93. Id. slip op. at 4. The alien also argued that the Arizona statute at issue in In re
Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, was distinguishable from the Texas statute under
which he was convicted, and that his offense was not a crime of violence because under Texas
law an additional provision requiring the use of a deadly weapon renders DUI an aggravated
offense, and that this provision was not met in his case. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No.
3412, slip op. at 3.
94. Id. slip op. at 4; see also supra note 46 (discussing and defining "specific intent").
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1. The Majority Opinion in In re Puente-Salazar
95 the
Following its previous decision in In re Magallanes-Garcia,
BIA rejected all of the alien's arguments and held that his Texas
conviction for DUI was a crime of violence under § 16(b). 96 The BIA
again applied the categorical approach 97 to determine whether the
alien's DUI conviction was a conviction for a crime of violence under §
16(b).9 8 Texas law defines "operating" a vehicle broadly; an offender
must merely "affect [the] functioning of a vehicle in a manner that
enables the vehicle's use." 99 The alien argued that this broad definition
of "operating" did not satisfy § 16(b)'s "substantial risk" language
00
because the definition presented, at most, a potential risk of harm.
The BIA rejected the alien's argument, stating that § 16(b)'s
"substantial risk" language must be read in conjunction with the nature
of the actions underlying the offense and whether those actions may
10
result in the use of physical force. 1

The BIA also rejected the alien's argument that § 16(b)'s requirement
that force "may be used in the course of committing the offense" created2
0
a requirement that the offender have specific intent to use such force.'
Citing In re Alcantar, the BIA noted that it previously held that §
16(b)'s "may be used" language could be satisfied by reckless
conduct. 10 3 The BIA then invoked In re Magallanes-Garciato support
04
the proposition that the offense of DUI is inherently reckless.
Applying these prior holdings, the BIA held that the alien's conviction
for DUI under Texas law was a crime of violence under § 16(b), and

95. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 14.
96. The BIA conceded that the alien's conviction was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a) because the offense did "not include as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another." Id. slip op. at 8.
97. See supra note 36 (discussing and defining the categorical approach).
98. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 9 (citing In re Palacios-Pinera,
Interim Dec. No. 3373, File No. A90 284 849 (B.I.A. Dec. 18, 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vllIintdec/id-pdf/3373.pdf; In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801 (B.I.A.
1994)).
99. Id. slip op. at 10 (citing Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Barton
v. State, 882 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
100. Id.
101. Id. In In re Magallanes-Garcia,the BIA characterized the "nature" of the offense of
DUI as malum in se. See In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90 219 200,
slip op. at 6 n.2 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/
Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf; see also supra note 90 (defining "malum in se").
102. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 12.
103. Id. (citing In reAlcantar,20 I. & N. Dec. at 801).
104. Id. (citing In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341).
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that specific intent to use force was not necessary to satisfy § 16(b).' °5
The BIA found that, by its nature, DUI involves a substantial risk that
physical force may be used against the person or property of another in
the commission of the offense and thus concluded that DUI is a crime of
violence under § 16(b). 106
Finally, the BIA addressed the alien's argument that the BIA had
ascertained and applied the wrong definition of crime of violence in its
10 7
prior decision in In re Magallanes-Garcia.
The alien argued that, in
In re Magallanes-Garcia,the BIA had improperly conflated the term
"risk of physical injury to another" with § 16(b)'s requirement that there
be a "risk of use of force."' 108 Tracking the language of the statute, the
alien argued that in order for DUI to be a crime of violence under §
16(b), there must be a "risk of use of force" rather than a "risk of
physical injury to another," as the BIA had held in In re MagallanesGarcia.10 9 The BIA recognized that in In re Magallanes-Garciait had
held that "the potential for harm" is the determinative factor in finding
that an offense is a crime of violence under § 16(b). 110 Emphasizing
that the reasoning and the conclusions of In re Magallanes-Garciawere
not altered by its decision in In re Puente-Salazar,the BIA clarified the
In re Magallanes-Garciaholding."' The BIA stated that there must be
a causal link between the harm and the force in order for an offense to
be a crime of violence under § 16(b). 112 The BIA reasoned that not all
criminal offenses that have the potential for harm carry a substantial risk
that force will be used in their commission. 113 Therefore, under In re
Puente-Salazar, the "potential for harm" must be connected with the
risk of the use of force in order for an offense to be a crime of violence
114
under § 16(b).
Illustrating this clarified principal in the context of DUI cases, the
BIA ultimately stated that in DUI cases the risk of injury to others is
directly related to a substantial risk that the offender will use physical

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. slip op. at 12-14.
108. Id. slip op. at 12-13.
109. Id.
110. Id. slip op. at 13 (citing In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90
219 200 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/
Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.
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force to cause that injury. 1 5 The focus, the BIA held, should be on the
conduct that is required for a conviction under the relevant DUI statute,
not on the consequences of the alien's offense. 116 Signaling that it
would apply In re Magallanes-Garciato other DUI convictions, the
BIA concluded that the alien's DUI conviction in Texas was a
conviction for a crime of violence under § 16(b).' 17
2. Member Rosenberg's Dissent in In re Puente-Salazar
Board Member Lory Diana Rosenberg filed a dissenting opinion
arguing that DUI is not necessarily a crime of violence under § 16(b)
because DUI does not present a risk that physical force will be used in
the course of committing the offense. 118 She opined that the BIA
inappropriately blurred the distinction between the substantial risk that
physical force would be used in the course of the commission of the
crime under § 16(b) and the risk of injury or harm that is required under
the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of violence. 1 9 Member
Rosenberg then reasoned that § 16(b) requires the substantial risk that
physical force be used, not that there exists the risk of physical injury or
harm. 120 Next, she argued that § 16(b)'s requirement that "force may be
used" requires deliberate action taken by the offender.12 1 In addition,
she argued that § 16(b)'s requirement that the force be used "in the
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. slip op. at 14. Board Member Edward R. Grant filed a concurring opinion in which
Board Member Lauri S. Filppu joined. Id. slip op. at 15 (Grant, concurring). Member Grant
wrote separately to address in more detail the argument the alien raised regarding whether the
"use of force" that § 16(b) requires must be the result of specific intent to use that force. Id. slip
op. at 16 (Grant, concurring). Member Grant recognized that the Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh and Third Circuits had, at the time that he was writing, suggested that DUI may not be a
crime of violence under § 16(b) because the offense does not require specific intent to use force.
Id. (Grant, concurring) (citing United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992)). Recognizing that the BIA's decision
in In re Puente-Salazarwas in tension with those Circuits and that the BIA's decision would have
precedential effect in the entire nation, Member Grant desired to explain further why the BIA had
determined that § 16(b) did not require specific intent to use force. Id. (Grant, concurring).
Member Grant opined that § 16(b)'s command to inquire into the "nature" of the offense shifts
the focus away from the mens rea of the offender and to the generic nature of the offense. Id. slip
op. at 17 (Grant, concurring). Member Grant opined that the BIA should focus on the nature of
the offense, rather than on the mens rea of the offender because determining whether an offender
had specific intent to use force would be speculative and unmanageable. Id. (Grant, concurring).
118. Id. slip op. at 19-20 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
119. Id. slip op. at 22-23 n.5 (Rosenberg, dissenting). Member Rosenberg noted that the
majority in In re Puente-Salazarhad conceded that the DUI conviction was not a crime of
violence under § 16(a). Id. at 23 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
120. Id. slip op. at 24 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
121. Id. slip op. at 29 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
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course of committing the offense" requires that the force be used to
accomplish the criminal end. 122 Finally, Member Rosenberg argued that
is a "divisible"'1 23
the DUI statute under which the alien was convicted
124
offense that may not constitute a crime of violence.
Arguing that the BIA erred in its decision in In re MagallanesGarcia,125 Member Rosenberg stated that the BIA overemphasized the
nature of DUI in relation to the risk that injury might occur. 126 Member
Rosenberg contended that the BIA should have focused on whether the
nature of DUI includes a substantial risk that physical force may be
used in the course of committing the offense, as required by the terms of
127
§ 16(b).
Member Rosenberg then argued that the "physical force" required by
§ 16(b) is more than the simple movement necessary to satisfy the
operating requirement under the Texas DUI statute.1 28 Citing United
States v. Rodriguez-Guzman 129 and the definition of "force" included in
Black's Law Dictionary,130 she stated that § 16(b)'s "physical force"

122. Id. slip op. at 30 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
123. A "divisible" statute "encompasses offenses that include as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, as
well as offenses that do not." In re Sweetser, Interim Dec. No. 3390, File No. A30 437 320, slip
op. at 6 (B.I.A. May 19, 1999) (citations omitted), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoial
bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3390.pdf. In In re Sweetser, the BIA held that "[w]here a statute
under which an alien was convicted is divisible, [the BIA] look[s] to the record of conviction, and
to other documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, to determine whether
the specific offense of which the alien was convicted" is a crime of violence under § 16. Id. slip
op. at 7.
124. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 20-21 (Rosenberg, dissenting)
(citing In re Sweetser, Interim Dec. No. 3390).
125. In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90 219 200 (B.I.A. Mar. 19,
1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf.
126. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 22 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
127. Id. slip op. at 30 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
128. Id. slip op. at 25 (Rosenberg, dissenting). Under the Texas DUI statute, a defendant
"operates" a vehicle when he "perform[s] a function, or operation, or produce[s] an effect." Id.
(Rosenberg, dissenting) (quoting Reddie v. State, 736 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
129. United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d 18, 20 n.8 (5th Cir. 1995). In RodriguezGuzman, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the word "force" in § 16(b) as "destructive or violent force."
Id.
130. Member Rosenberg quoted the definition of "force" as: "'[p]ower, violence, compulsion,
or constraint exerted upon or against a person or thing ....
[S]trength directed to an end.
Commonly the word occurs in such connections as to show that unlawful or wrongful action is
meant."' In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 25 (Rosenberg, dissenting)
(alterations in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 644 (6th ed. 1990)). Member
Rosenberg also relied upon the definition of "physical force," which Black's Law Dictionary
defines as "'[florce applied to the body; actual violence."' Id. (Rosenberg, dissenting)
(alterations in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (6th ed. 1990)). Finally,
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language requires violent or destructive physical force.' 3 1 Member
Rosenberg also noted that under § 16(b), the verb "use" refers to the
offender's conduct and suggests that the offender must risk taking
specific, violent action. 132 Compiling cases construing the term "use"
as requiring some sort of intentional conduct on the part of the
offender, 133 Member Rosenberg urged that in order to satisfy the "use"
requirement, the offender must have actively undertaken a course of
action with the awareness that his conduct may result in the need to use
force to perpetrate the crime. 134 Member Rosenberg thus concluded
that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because a drunk driver
does not take deliberate action or create the risk of using force in order
35
to complete the crime.1
Member Rosenberg also argued that the Texas DUI statute does not
satisfy § 16(b)'s requirement that the force be used "in the course of
committing the offense."' 36 She reasoned that DUI does not involve a
risk that force will be used "in the course of committing the offense"
because DUI is committed at the point that the offender begins to
37
operate the vehicle within the meaning of the DUI statute. 1
Finally, Member Rosenberg argued that the Texas DUI statute is
divisible under the BIA's decision in In re Sweetser 138 and that the BIA
Member Rosenberg also relied on the definition of "violence," which Black's Law Dictionary
defines as:
"[ulnjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of
vehemence, outrage, or fury ....Physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force;
that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against
public liberty.... The exertion of any physical force so as to injure, damage or abuse."
Id. (Rosenberg, dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1570-71
(6th ed. 1990)).
131. Id. (Rosenberg, dissenting).
132. Id. slip op. at 26 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
133. Id. (Rosenberg, dissenting) (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 148 (1995))
(holding that "use" requires more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a
drug offense); see also Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993) (quoting dictionary
definitions of "use" suggesting intentional conduct is implied by the term); United States v.
Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "use" implies intentional availment);
United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that "[u]se of physical force is
an intentional act" requiring specific intent to use force).
134. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 28 (Rosenberg, dissenting)
(citing Bailey, 516 U.S. at 144).
135. Id. slip op. at 29 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
136. Id. (Rosenberg, dissenting).
137. Id. slip op. at 30 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
138. In re Sweetser, Interim Dec. No. 3390, File No. A30 437 320 (B.I.A. May 19, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bialDecisionsRevdec/pdfDEC/3390.pdf. In In re
Sweetser, the BIA held that when a statute under which an alien was convicted is divisible, it will
look to the record of conviction to determine whether the offense is a crime of violence under §
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should have looked into the underlying factual circumstances of the
139
alien's conviction instead of applying the categorical approach.
Member Rosenberg argued that the Texas DUI statute is divisible
because it criminalizes both operating and driving a vehicle, and
because the alien's record of conviction does not disclose whether the
alien had been convicted based on "driving" or "operating" a vehicle
while under the influence. 14° Because the record of conviction
presented to the BIA on appeal did not contain specific information
about the underlying factual circumstances of the conviction, Member
Rosenberg contended that the BIA should have determined the minimal
course of conduct necessary to constitute the offense. 14 1 Member
Rosenberg ultimately concluded that the minimum conduct required in
order to sustain a conviction under the Texas DUI statute at issue does
not satisfy the definition of crime of violence under § 16(b) because
merely "operating" a vehicle does not present a risk of the use of
force. 142
III. DISCUSSION
The Courts of Appeals are split over whether DUI presents a risk that
the offender will "use" force within the meaning of § 16(b). The Tenth
Circuit has held that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b) and that a
drunk driver risks the use of force in the course of committing the
offense. 14 3 The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held
that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because § 16(b)
144
requires volitional conduct that DUI generally does not satisfy.
Specifically, the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits require that the
offense include a risk that the offender will intentionally use force
16. Id. slip op. at 6; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text (providing further
explanation of divisible statutes).
139. See In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 32-33 (Rosenberg,
dissenting).
140. Id. slip op. at 33-34 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
141. Id. slip op. at 34 (Rosenberg, dissenting) (citing In re Sweetser, Interim Dec. No. 3390).
142. Id. slip op. at 35 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
143. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 14767 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Tapia Garcia). The BIA is
in accord with the Tenth Circuit's determination that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b).
See, e.g., In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412. As noted in Part I, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that a DUI-related offense is a crime of violence under § 16(a). See Le v. U.S. Att'y
Gen., 196 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11 th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also supra note 21 (discussing Le).
Whether DUI-related offenses are crimes of violence under § 16(a) is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
144. See supra note 20 (explaining the holdings of the Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits).
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against the person or property of another. 145 The Ninth Circuit,
however, requires that the offense present a risk that the offender will
intentionally or recklessly apply force against another in the course of
committing the offense. 146
A. Tapia Garcia v. INS: DUI is a Crime of Violence Under § 16(b)
In Tapia Garcia v. INS, 147 the Tenth Circuit held that DUI could be a
crime of violence under § 16(b) because the generic elements of DUI
present a substantial risk that physical force may be used. 148 The Tapia
Garcia court did not specifically address whether the verb "use"
included in § 16(b) implied that the offender must risk committing an
intentional act of force. 149 In this case, the alien had been convicted in
Idaho of DUI. 15 0 An immigration judge concluded that the alien's
conviction for DUI was a crime of violence under § 16(b) and ordered
the alien removed. 15 1 The alien subsequently appealed to the BIA, and
152
the BIA dismissed the appeal.
The court reviewed the BIA's interpretation of "immigration statutes"
applying the Chevron153 deference. The court stated that because §
16(b) is subject to differing interpretations, the court would defer to the
145. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a New York
conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated is not a conviction of a crime of violence
under § 16); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding
that a Texas conviction for driving while intoxicated is not a conviction of a crime of violence
under § 16), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 612
(7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an Indiana conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a
Wisconsin conviction for homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, and an Illinois conviction for
driving under the influence were not convictions for "crimes of violence" under § 16).
146. United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).
147. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d 1216.
148. Id. at 1223.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1217. At the time, the Idaho DUI statute provided in relevant part:
It is unlawful for any person who is an habitual user of, or under the influence of any
narcotic drug, or who is under the influence of any other drug or any combination of
alcohol and any other drug to a degree which impairs the driver's ability to safely
operate a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or
upon public or private property open to public use.
Id. at 1221 n.5 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 18-8004(5) (Michie 1999)). "In order for an offense under
this section to qualify as a felony, the defendant must have pled guilty or been found guilty of two
previous violations for driving under the influence within five years." Id. (citing IDAHO CODE §
18-8005(5) (Michie 1999)).
151. Id. at 1217.
152. Id. The BIA agreed with the immigration judge that the alien's DUI conviction
constituted a crime of violence under § 16(b). Id.
153. Id. at 1220; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984); supra note 65 (describing the Chevron deference owed to the BIA).
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BIA if it had reasonably interpreted the statute. 154 In determining
whether the alien's conviction for DUI was a crime of violence under §
16(b), the court applied the categorical approach, considering only the
generic elements of the offense and refusing to look into the underlying
factual circumstances of the conviction. 155 The court noted that the BIA
also applied a categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a
crime of violence under § 16(b) and did not inquire into the factual
circumstances of the underlying conviction.1 56
The court then
summarized the BIA's decision in In re Puente-Salazar,157 and stated
that the BIA emphasized that the definition of crime of violence under §
58
16(b) does not require intentional conduct.1
The court then held that the BIA reasonably construed § 16(b) as
including the offense of DUI, finding support for this holding in other
federal decisions interpreting the definition of crime of violence under
the Sentencing Guidelines. 59 The court stated that these cases
154. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1220-21. In addition to determining whether DUI is a crime of
violence under § 16(b), the court also determined that the alien's appeal was not moot because his
deportation had "collateral consequences" making his case a controversy cognizable on appeal.
Id. at 1218. At the time of the appeal, the alien had already been deported and resided in Mexico.
Id. at 1217. The court held that although the alien was "no longer subject to deportation and [was]
not being detained by the INS," his appeal was not moot because of the collateral consequences
of his deportation. Id. at 1218. The alien's "removal and status as an aggravated felon render
him permanently inadmissible" unless certain unlikely requirements are met and this "inability to
reenter and reside legally in the United States with his family is a collateral consequence of his
deportation because it is clearly a concrete disadvantage imposed as a matter of law." Id.
Finally, the court also held that it retained jurisdiction to determine whether the INA's
jurisdictional bar applied. Id. at 1218-20; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text
(discussing the amendments to the INA limiting judicial review of final orders of removal in
certain cases). That is, the court retained jurisdiction to determine whether the petitioner was an
alien deportable for committing an aggravated felony. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1218-20.
155. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1221-22 (citing; Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 (5th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also supra note
36 (discussing the categorical approach as it is applied by the BIA in the context of § 16).
156. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222 (citing In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341,
File No. A90 219 200 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf).
157. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517 (B.I.A. Sept. 29,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoialbia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3412.pdf; see
also supra notes 91-142 and accompanying text (discussing In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec.
No. 3412).
158. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1222 (citing In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412).
159. Id. (citing United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995)). Since the Tapia Garcia decision, two of the three
circuits that decided these cases have held that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16. See
Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921,
924 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). In addition, the Fifth
Circuit's decision in DeSantiago-Gonzalezexpressly recognized that the interpretation of crime
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recognized the inherent danger involved in the offense of DUI. 160 The
court noted that the definition of crime of violence at issue in those
cases 16 1 differed slightly from the definition of crime of violence under
§ 16(b). 162 Despite the differing definitions, the court followed the
reasoning of those cases by applying the Sentencing Guidelines'
definition of crime of violence. 163 The court relied on prior Tenth
Circuit precedent, finding the rationale of a case interpreting § 16(b)
persuasive in analyzing whether an offense constitutes a crime of
violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.164 Noting the inherent
danger involved in DUI and relying on cases finding that DUI is a crime
of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines' definition, the court held
that a DUI offense may constitute a crime of violence under § 16(b)
because the generic elements of DUI present "a substantial risk that
physical force ...may be used."' 165 After determining that the alien's
conviction was a crime of violence under § 16(b) and, therefore, an
"aggravated felony" under the INA, the court dismissed the alien's
66
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 1
B. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Decisions Holding
that DUI is not a Crime of Violence Under § 16(b)
Since the Tenth Circuit held that DUI is a crime of violence under §
16(b), 167 four Courts of Appeals have held that DUI is not a crime of
violence under § 16(b). 168 Each of these courts found that the inclusion
of violence under § 16 was not controlling for the purposes of interpreting the Sentencing
Guidelines. See infra note 187 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's reference to DeSantiago-Gonzalez
in its interpretation of § 16).
160. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222.
161. Those cases were interpreting the definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing
Guidelines, which includes "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2001). In addition, "the
commentary accompanying [the Sentencing Guidelines] defines crime of violence in part as an
offense involving 'by its nature.., a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."' Tapia
Garcia,237 F.3d at 1223 n.6 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2, cmt. 2).
162. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222-23; see also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text
(discussing the evolution of the definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines).
163. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1223.
164. Id. (citing United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998)).
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing an alien's inability to seek
judicial review of a final order of removal where the alien is convicted of an aggravated felony).
167. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1223; see also supra notes 147-66 and accompanying text
(discussing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Tapia Garcia).
168. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
DUI with injury to another is not a crime of violence under § 16); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
200, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16); Bazan-Reyes v.

2002]

DUI as a Crime of Violence

of the verb "use" in § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence implied
that an offender must risk the volitional use of force in order to commit
a crime of violence. 169 Each court held that DUI is not a crime of
violence because a drunk driver does not risk the use of volitional force
in the course of committing the offense. 170 The Second, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits held that in order for an offense to be a crime of
violence under § 16(b), the offender must risk the use of intentional
force. 17 1 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that an offense could meet §
16(b)'s definition of crime of violence where an offender risks
recklessly applying force against another in the course of committing
172
the crime.
1. Chapa-Garza:The Fifth Circuit Holds that DUI
is not a Crime of Violence
Citing three reasons, the Fifth Circuit determined that felony Texas
DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b). 173 First, holding that DUI

INS, 256 F.3d 600, 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that DUI and homicide by intoxicated use of a
vehicle are not crimes of violence under § 16); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924
(5th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that DUI is not a conviction of a crime of violence under § 16),
reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). In addition, the Third Circuit, in dictum, has
suggested that it too would hold that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16. See United States
v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992).
169. See Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146; Dalton, 257 F.3d at 206; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d
at 612; Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924.
170. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146; Dalton, 257 F.3d at 206; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at
612; Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924.
171. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 206; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 612; Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924.
172. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.
173. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924. Judge Barksdale filed an opinion dissenting from the
denial of rehearing. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 262 F.3d 479, 480 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale,
J., dissenting). Judge Jones concurred in Judge Barksdale's dissent "to the extent that the
difficulty of statutory construction in [the] case and the far-reaching significance of the panel
decision should have motivated [the] court to rehear [the] case en banc." Id. at 480 n.l
(Barksdale, J., dissenting). Judge Barksdale opined that the court erroneously held that felony
DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) and that the court should have reheard the case
because it was an issue of national importance. Id. at 480-81 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
Judge Barksdale agreed that the categorical approach was proper for determining whether an
offense is a crime of violence under § 16(b), but argued that the Chapa-Garza court reached the
wrong result by parsing the language of § 16 and overlooking the common-sense meaning of the
statutory language. Id. at 482 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). For Judge Barksdale, the distinction
between the "risk of injury" language contained in the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime
of violence and the "risk of force" language contained in § 16(b) was immaterial because the
distinction merely distinguishes the cause from the effect. Id. at 481 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
Judge Barksdale opined that the verb "use" does not require intentional conduct, stating that it
is possible to unintentionally use force. Id. at 482 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). Judge Barksdale
stated that the verb "use" in combination with the phrase "substantial risk" suggests that an
offender can commit a crime of violence without intending to use force. Id. (Barksdale, J.,
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is a crime of violence under § 16(b) would require that the provision be
construed in the same way as the significantly broader definition of
crime of violence contained in the Sentencing Guidelines.174 Second,
the court determined that because § 16(b) requires that, to be a crime of
violence, an offense include a substantial risk that physical force may be
used, an offender must recklessly disregard the probability that
intentional force may be employed. 175 The court held that the offense
of DUI does not meet this requirement. 176 Third, the physical force
described in § 16(b) is the force that is "used in the course of
committing the offense" and not the force that may be a result of the
offense. 177
dissenting). Relying on a list of synonyms for the verb "use," Judge Barksdale stated that one can
unintentionally use force. Id. at 482 n.2 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (1986)). Also, Judge
Barksdale found the burglary analogy advanced in United States v. Parson, and quoted in ChapaGarza, unpersuasive because the dangers presented by the offense of burglary arise from
intentional acts, while the dangers involved in DUI result from unintentional acts. Id. at 483
(Barksdale, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992)). Judge
Barksdale further stated that a drunk driver can foresee the substantial risk of the potential use of
force during the commission of DUI. Id. (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
Judge Barksdale also found error in the Chapa-Garza court's interpretation of § 16(b)'s
requirement that the force be used "in the course of committing the offense." Id. at 483-84
(Barksdale, J., dissenting). Judge Barksdale opined that § 16(b) did not refer to the force required
in order to complete the offense, but rather referred to the force used while completing the
offense. Id. at 484 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Barksdale stated that in order to be
convicted of felony DUI under the Texas statute, the offender must have committed at least three
DUI offenses. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b) (Vernon 1997)). Judge Barksdale
opined that although not every DUI may be a crime of violence under § 16(b), a felony DUI is a
crime of violence because an offender who has been arrested three times for DUI presents a real
and great risk to society. Id. (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
174. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924. The Sentencing Guidelinesdefines crime of violence
similarly, but not identically to the definition of crime of violence under § 16. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bt.2(a) (2001); supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text
(discussing the evolution of the definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines).
175. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924.
176. Id.
177. Id. The court decided Chapa-Garzaless than eight months after it withdrew its opinion
in Camacho-Marroquinv. INS. See Camacho-Marroquin v. INS, 188 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1999),
withdrawn, 222 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 2000). In Camacho-Marroquin,the court held that DUI is a
crime of violence under § 16(b), relying on "the federal courts' recognition of the substantial risk
that force may be used by drunk drivers." Camacho-Marroquin,188 F.3d at 652 (citing Mich.
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (noting that drunk drivers annually cause
over 25,000 deaths, approximately one million personal injuries, and more than $5 billion in
property damage); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Drunk driving,
by its nature, presents a serious risk of physical injury.")). The Chapa-Garza court
acknowledged that it had previously decided that DUI is a crime of violence, but refused to
follow the withdrawn opinion. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924. The court withdrew CanchoMarroquin "at the alien's request to enable the [INS] to proceed with his deportation in lieu of
incarceration." Kemper, supra note 68, at 611.
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In United States v. Chapa-Garza,the court reviewed the consolidated
appeal of five aliens who pled guilty to unlawfully being in the United
States after removal. 178 The aliens appealed the district courts'
179
imposition of longer sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines.
They argued that the district courts incorrectly determined that felony
DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b), thus subjecting them to longer
sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines.180 The court reviewed the
18 1
district courts' interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.
The court focused on the definition of crime of violence contained in §
16(b), stating that it was the only justification for the increased
sentences that each alien received. 182 Noting § 16(b)'s "by its nature"
language, the court applied the categorical approach to determine
183
whether Texas felony DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b).
The court refused to interpret § 16(b)'s definition of crime of
violence in the same way that the Seventh Circuit had interpreted the
Sentencing Guidelines' definition of the term. 184 The court noted that

178. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 923. Unlawfully remaining in the United States after removal
is a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Id.
179. Id. The district courts in all of the underlying proceedings had sentenced each alien to a
longer sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. (citing U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2 (1998)). Under § 2L1.2, an alien is subject to a longer sentence for unlawfully
being in the United States after removal therefrom, where removal from the United States was
preceded by an "aggravated felony" as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Id. In each case, the
district court had determined that the aliens' prior convictions for Texas felony DUI were crimes
of violence under § 16(b) and applied the increased sentences called for in § 2L1.2. Id.
180. Id. The aliens also argued that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey put into doubt the continuing vitality of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States. Id. at 923-24 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). In Almendarez-Torres, the
Supreme Court "held that the enhanced penalties contained in [8 U.S.C. §] 1326(b) were mere
sentencing factors and not elements of a separate offense." Id. at 928 (citing Almendarez-Torres,
523 U.S. at 235). The aliens argued "that Justice Thomas, one of the five justices who joined in
the Supreme Court's Almendarez-Torres opinion, may no longer support its holding." Id. (citing
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring)). If the enhanced penalties contained in 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b) were elements of a separate offense, the aliens argued, then "the fact that
triggers the higher maximum sentence ... [must be] alleged in the indictment." Id. at 924.
Holding that the Almendarez-Torres decision "is not overruled unless and until the United States
Supreme Court says it is," the court rejected the aliens' argument that the Apprendi decision
prevented "them from being sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than two years." Id. at
928.
181. Id. at 924 (citing United States v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1998)).
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also supra note 36 (providing a more detailed discussion of the categorical
approach).
184. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 925 (citing United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.
1995)); see also supra note 58 (quoting the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of
violence).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

the Seventh Circuit held that DUI is a crime of violence under the
Sentencing Guidelines' definition because DUI is an inherently reckless
act that often results in physical injury. 185 Comparing the definition of
crime of violence included in the Sentencing Guidelines with the
definition found in § 16(b), the court emphasized that the Sentencing
Guidelines' definition only requires that the offense involve conduct
that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another person. 186 In
contrast, § 16(b) requires that there be a substantial risk that the
offender will use physical force against the person or property of
another in the course of committing the offense. 187 The court also noted
that, prior to 1989, the Sentencing Guidelines incorporated § 16's
definition of crime of violence by reference, but that the Sentencing
Commission had since amended the Sentencing Guidelines' definition
of crime of violence. 188 The court stated that this amendment counseled
against interpreting the definitions under § 16(b) and the Sentencing
1 89
Guidelines in the same way.
The court also held that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b)
because § 16(b)'s definition includes only those offenses in which there
is a substantial likelihood that the offender will intentionally employ
physical force. 190 The court read § 16(b) as requiring a risk of
intentional conduct, not accidental or unintended events. 19 1 In so
holding, the court focused on the inclusion of the verb "use" in §
16(b)'s definition of crime of violence. 192 Relying on the dictionary
definition of the verb "use," the court determined that "use" refers to
"volitional, purposeful, not accidental, employment of whatever is being
'used."' 19 3 The court also noted that its understanding of "use" under §

185. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 925 n.7 (quoting Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 376-77).
186. Id. at 925.
187. Id. The court also discussed its previous decision in United States v. DeSantiagoGonzalez, in which the court recognized that the definitions of crime of violence found in § 16
and the Sentencing Guidelines were "similar... but not identical" and that the interpretation of
one did not control the interpretation of the other. Id. at 925-26 (quoting United States v.
DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2000)).
188. Id. at 926.
189. Id. The court, however, failed to note that the Sentencing Commission had stated that the
change was meant to clarify the terminology rather than to effect a substantive change in the
definition of crime of violence. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the
Sentencing Commission's reasons for revising the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of "crime of
violence").
190. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 926.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (emphasis added). The definition of the verb "use" that the court relied on was:
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16(b) was in accord with the Third Circuit's opinion in United States v.
Parson194 and quoted at length from the discussion in Parson, which
compared and contrasted § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence with
195
the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of violence.
Finally, the court held that the force necessary to satisfy § 16(b) is the
force necessary to perpetrate the offense. 196 The court focused on §

1.To put into service or apply for a purpose; employ. 2. To avail oneself of; practice:
use caution. 3. To conduct oneself toward; treat or handle: used his colleagues well. 4.
To seek or achieve an end by means of; exploit: felt he was being used. To take or
consume; partake of: She rarely used alcohol.
Id. (quotations omitted) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (3d ed.
1997)).
194. United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992).
195. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 926 (citing Parson, 955 F.2d at 866). In Parson, the Third
Circuit compared the definition of crime of violence contained in the Sentencing Guidelines with
§ 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence. Parson, 955 F.2d at 863-67. The court emphasized that
the revised definition included in the Sentencing Guidelines mixes the "use of force" language
included in § 16(b) with the "risk of physical injury" language. Id. at 865-66. The court noted
that the first branch of the revised Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of violence "retains
the focus on 'use of physical force' . . . categorically includ[ing] offenses having 'as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force."' Id. at 866. The court stated that the
use of physical force is an intentional act and suggested that the definition of crime of violence
under § 16(b) requires that an offender must be willing to risk committing a crime of specific
intent in order to complete the offense. See id. The distinction is a crucial one that has been
discussed in later cases. See, e.g., Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924. The Third Circuit expanded on
the difference between the "use of force" language included in § 16(b) and the "risk of physical
injury" language included in the Sentencing Guidelines:
At first blush, the difference in phrasing appears trivial because most physical injury
comes from the use of physical force. But the distinction is significant. Use of physical
force is an intentional act, and therefore the first prong of both definitions requires
specific intent to use force. As to the second prong of the original definition, a
defendant's commission of a crime that, by its nature, is likely to require force
similarly suggests a willingness to risk having to commit a crime of specific intent. For
example, a burglar of a dwelling risks having to use force if the occupants are home
and hear the burglar. In such a case, the burglar has a mens rea legally nearly as bad as
a specific intent to use force, for he or she recklessly risks having to commit a specific
intent crime.
In contrast, under the second prong of the revised definition, criminals whose actions
merely risk causing physical injury may have a lower mens rea of "pure" recklessness:
they may lack an intent, desire or willingness to use force or cause harm at all. For
example, a parent who leaves a young child unattended near a pool may risk serious
injury to the child, but the action does not involve an intent to use force or otherwise
harm the child. Similarly, a drunk driver risks causing severe injury to others on the
road or in the car, but in most cases he or she does not intend to use force to harm
others.
Parson, 955 F.2d at 866; see also supra note 46 (defining and discussing "mens rea" and
"specific intent").
196. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 927 (quoting United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418,
422 (5th Cir. 1996)). In Velazquez-Overa, the court "held that the crime of indecency with a
child involving sexual contact was a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because it
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16(b)'s requirement that the risked force be "used in the course of
committing the offense."' 197 DUI does not present a risk that the
offender will use force in the course of committing the offense; rather
DUI presents a risk that force may result from the commission of the
98
offense. 1
The court concluded by holding that a drunk driver does not risk the
intentional use of force against the person or property of another by
driving under the influence. 199 Rather, the risk that a drunk driver takes
is the risk of getting into an accident with the person or property of
another. 20 0 Any physical force that is the result of an accident with a
drunk driver has not been intentionally "used" against the other person,
20 1
and was not "used" in order to perpetrate the offense.
2. Bazan-Reyes v. INS: The Seventh Circuit Holds that a
Crime of Violence Requires "Volitional Conduct" not Present
in the Offense of DUI
2
In Bazan-Reyes v. INS, °2 the Seventh Circuit found that DUI is not a
crime of violence under § 16(b) because a drunk driver does not risk the
intentional use of force within the meaning of the provision. 20 3 The
court found that, in order to be a crime of violence under § 16(b), the
offender must risk the intentional use of physical force in the course of
committing the offense. 2°4 The Seventh Circuit primarily relied on its

was likely that the perpetrator would find it necessary to use physical force to 'ensure the child's
compliance' and 'perpetrate the crime."' Id. (quoting Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d at 422).
197. Id. at 924.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 927.
200. Id.
201. Id. In so holding, the court noted that its decision was compatible with its earlier
decision in United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, in which it "held that unauthorized use of
another's motor vehicle, or joy riding, was a crime of violence as defined by section 16(b)." Id.
(citing United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1999)). The court stated
that the holdings were consistent because "there is a substantial risk that physical force will be
used against a vehicle in order to obtain the unauthorized access to it that is necessary for the
commission of the offense of joy riding." Id. at 928. Section 16(b) embraces offenses that
involve "a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
202. Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
203. Id. at 612.
204. See id. In addition, the court noted that intentional force used by the offenders to open
the car door or press the accelerator "does not constitute the use of physical force as required by"
§ 16(b) because the "physical force" used must be "actual violent force." Id. at 611 (following
Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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decision in United States v. Rutherford,2 5 the Third Circuit's dicta in
United States v. Parson,206 and the Fifth Circuit's decision in United
20 7
States v. Chapa-Garza
in holding that DUI is not a crime of violence
205. United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995). In Rutherford, the Seventh
Circuit held that DUI is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 376-77. In
Rutherford, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's determination that the defendant's
Alabama conviction for first-degree assault, which includes DUI with causing serious bodily
injury to another, was a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 371-72.
The court focused on what level of mens rea the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of
violence requires. See id. at 372-74 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4B1.2(l)(i)(ii)). The defendant argued that the inclusion of the word "use" in the first prong of
the definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines implies that the defendant
must perform an intentional act. See id. at 372 (discussing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 4B1.2(1)(i)). Drawing on the dictionary definitions of "use," the court agreed and
found that the verb "use" implies "intentional availment." Id. at 372-73 n.6 (citing WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1299 (1986); 19 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 350
(2d ed. 1989)). The court noted that a drunk driving accident is generally not the result of a plan,
but rather is usually the result of recklessness. See id. at 372. It also noted that in everyday
English, few would say that a drunk driver who caused an accident "used" his car to cause harm
or hurt someone. Id. This interpretation of the first prong of the definition of crime of violence
under the Sentencing Guidelines accords with the interpretation of two other courts that have
discussed the definition. Id. at 373 (citing United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir,
1993); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992)).
The court went on to determine whether vehicular assault is a crime of violence under the
second prong of the Sentencing Guidelines' definition. See id. at 374-77 (discussing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(l)(ii)). The defendant argued that crimes of
recklessness should not be considered crimes of violence and that the conduct underlying his
assault conviction did not create a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another" within the
meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 374. The court rejected both of the defendant's
arguments and held that the defendant's conviction was a crime of violence under the second
prong of the definition, affirming the district court's decision to apply an increased sentence. See
id. at 374, 377. The court rejected the defendant's first argument, stating that the second prong of
the amended definition of crime of violence includes some reckless criminal acts that are
dangerous. Id. at 374 (citing United States v. Rutledge, 33 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir. 1994); Parson,
955 F.2d at 861, 873). Addressing the defendant's second argument, the court found that by
driving under the influence, the defendant "presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another" within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 376 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(1)(ii)). Because drunk driving is a reckless act that frequently
results in injury, the court held that the defendant's Alabama conviction for first-degree assault
was a conviction of a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 376-77
(discussing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.2(1)(ii)).
Judge Easterbrook concurred in the result, but did not join in the opinion of the majority. See
id. at 377-79 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). He disagreed with the majority's finding that the verb
"use" required some volitional conduct. See id. at 378 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Judge
Easterbrook stated that the act forbidden by the definition of a crime of violence is the use of
force against a person. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring). He argued that the majority incorrectly
found a mens rea requirement in § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence instead of focusing on
the forbidden act. Id. at 379 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
206. Parson, 955 F.2d 858; see also supra notes 63 & 195 (discussing the Third Circuit's
decision in Parson in detail).
207. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 262
F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001).
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under § 16(b). 20 8 In Bazan-Reyes, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
consolidated appeals of three aliens, whom the INS and BIA found
removable as a result of state DUI convictions. 2° Each of the aliens
2 10
sought review of the INS and BIA decisions finding him removable.
The aliens argued that their convictions for DUI and DUI-related
offenses were not crimes of violence under § 16(b). 2 1 1

208. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 607-12.
209. Id. at 602. One of the aliens, a citizen of Mexico, had been ordered removed by the INS
after the alien had pled guilty to Indiana felony DUI. Id. at 602-03. This alien had been
convicted under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-3, which provides, in relevant part: "'A person
commits a Class D felony if: (1) the person has a previous conviction of operating while
intoxicated; and (2) the previous conviction of operating while intoxicated occurred within the
five (5) years immediately preceding the occurrence of the violation of section 1 or 2 of this
chapter."' Id. at 602 n.1 (quoting IND. CODE § 9-30-5-3 (1998)). Section 1, referred to in the
previously quoted section provides: "'(a) A person who operates a vehicle with at least tenhundredths percent (0.10%) of alcohol by weight in grams in: (1) one hundred (100) milliliters of
the person's blood; or (2) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath; commits a Class C
felony."' Id. (quoting IND. CODE § 9-30-5-1 (1998)). An immigration judge ordered the other
two aliens, one a citizen of Poland and the other a citizen of Mexico, removed from the United
States. Id. Each of these two aliens then appealed that order to the BIA, which dismissed both
appeals. Id. at 603-04. The Mexican citizen pled guilty to Illinois aggravated felony DUI. Id.
At the time of the offense, the Illinois statute provided, in relevant part:
(d)(1) Every person convicted of committing a violation of this Section shall be guilty
of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a combination of both
if:
(A) the person committed a violation of this Section, or a similar provision of a law of
another state or a local ordinance when the cause of action is the same as or
substantially similar to this Section, for the third subsequent time ....
Id. at 604 n.3 (quoting 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(d)(1) (1997)). (The court incorrectly
cited the statute as "ILL. COMP. STAT. Ch. 625, § 5/511-501(d)(1) (1997)." There is no such
statute.) The Polish citizen pled guilty to "two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a
vehicle," a Wisconsin felony. Id. at 603. The Wisconsin statute provided in relevant part:
Homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle or firearm
(1) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class C felony:
(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant.
(b) Causes the death of another by the operation of a vehicle while the person has a
prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in sec. 340.01(46m).
Id. at 603 n.2 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 940.09 (1996)).
210. Id. at 604.
211. Id. The aliens argued that the offenses were not crimes of violence under § 16(b) and
therefore not "aggravated felonies" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and that they
were, therefore, not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Id.; see also supra notes 6870 and accompanying text (discussing the removal of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies).
The court also determined that, under LIRIRA, it retained jurisdiction to review the removal order
in order to determine the threshold issue of whether the aliens' DUI convictions were "aggravated
felonies" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 604 (citing SolarzanoPatlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2000); Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir.
1999)). In addition, the court rejected one of the alien's argument that, as a parolee, he could not
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The court reviewed de novo the INS and BIA orders finding the
aliens removable for having committed aggravated felonies, 2 12 but
noted that the BIA is entitled to Chevron deference when it is
interpreting a statute that it administers. 2 13 Because each of the aliens
was sentenced to a year or more of imprisonment, the only issue left to
determine was whether each alien's state DUI conviction was a
conviction for a crime of violence as defined in § 16.214 The court
applied the categorical approach 2 15 in examining whether the generic
elements of the offense under which the aliens were convicted
constituted a crime of violence under § 16.216 In determining whether
DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b), the court focused squarely on
the mens rea required to satisfy the crime. 217 The court reviewed the
BIA decisions that held that crimes of recklessness, such as DUI, are
crimes of violence under § 16(b). 2 18 The aliens argued that the BIA's
interpretation of crime of violence was incorrect and that § 16(b)
requires a substantial risk that intentional force will be used. 2 19 The
court noted the circuit split, 220 explaining that the Seventh Circuit had
never directly addressed the issue of whether DUI is a crime of violence
under § 16.221

be placed in expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b), holding that "[n]othing in
that section prohibits its application to parolees." Id. at 605.
212. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 605 (citing Xiong, 173 F.3d at 605).
213. Id. (citing Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2001)). But see Dalton v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2001) (arguing that a court should review de novo,
without applying deference to the BIA's interpretation of crime of violence under § 16 because §
16 is not a part of the INA). See also supra note 65 (discussing when courts owe Chevron
deference to the BIA).
214. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 605-06.
215. See supra note 36 (discussing the categorical approach of statutory interpretation).
216. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 606 (citing Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir.
2001)).
217. Id. at 606-07.
218. Id. at 606 (citing In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517
(B.I.A. Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/biaDecisions/Revdec/
pdfDEC/3412.pdf; In re Sweetser, Interim Dec. No. 3390, File No. A30 437 320 (B.I.A. May 19,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoialbialDecisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3390.pdf; In
re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90 219 200 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3341.pdf; In re
Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801 (B.I.A. 1994)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 607 (citing Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018, 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001);
Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); Le v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (1 1th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992)).
221. Id. The court held that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(a). Id. at 609. The
court also held that homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle is not a crime of violence under §
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Noting that both parties agreed that the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Rutherford222 was central to deciding the issue, the court launched into
an extended analysis of that case and of the different definitions of
223
crime of violence in both § 16(b) and the Sentencing Guidelines.
First, the court reviewed the history of the definition of crime of
violence contained in the Sentencing Guidelines.224 Then, the court
concluded that the definition of crime of violence included in the second
prong of the Sentencing Guidelines' definition225 is distinct from the
definition of crime of violence under § 16(b).226 The court emphasized
that in Rutherford, it held that specific intent to use force was not
required by the second prong of the Sentencing Guidelines'
definition. 227 As a result, DUI is a crime of violence under the
Sentencing Guidelines' definition because of the risk of injury that DUI
228
presents.
The court rejected the government's argument that Rutherford
required the court to hold that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b)
because the language of § 16(b) is substantially similar to the language
of the Sentencing Guidelines' definition. 229 The government argued
that the Sentencing Commission did not intend to change the meaning
of crime of violence when it amended the Sentencing Guidelines'
definition. 230 The court specifically dismissed this argument, stating
that the evolution of the term "crime of violence" under the Sentencing

16(a) because the offense does not require the intentional use of force against the person or
property of another. Id. The court held that its determination in Rutherford that the verb "use"
requires volitional conduct controlled its application of § 16(a) because the language of § 16(a) is
nearly identical to the language of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.2(1)(i) (2001)).
222. United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995); see also supra note 205
(discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rutherford).
223. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 607-12 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4B 1.2(l) (2001)).
224. See id. at 608.
225. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(l)(ii) (2001).
226. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 608.
227. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.2(l)(ii) (2001).
228. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 608-09.
229. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 608-09; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(l)
(2001).
230. Id. at 609 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C at 106-07 (1991)).
Until 1989, the Sentencing Guidelines incorporated by reference § 16's definition of crime of
violence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C at 106-07 (1991).
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Guidelines did not control its decision because the court was
231
interpreting § 16(b) and not the Sentencing Guidelines.
In addition, the court refused to follow the Tenth Circuit holding that
DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b). 232 Instead, the court relied on
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Chapa-Garza233and the Third Circuit's
decision in Parson.234 Following these decisions, the court concluded
that § 16(b)'s requirement that the force "be used in the course of
committing the offense" counseled against interpreting § 16(b) in the
same way as the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of
violence. 235 In addition, the court followed its determination in
Rutherford that the verb "use" implies intentional availment. 236 The
court concluded that § 16(b)'s use of the verb "use" also implies an
intent requirement. 237 Therefore, the court held that, in order for an
offense to be a crime of violence under § 16(b), the offender must risk
the intentional use of physical force in the course of committing the
offense. 238 The court explained that this interpretation does not render §
16(a) and § 16(b) redundant. 239 The court noted that burglary does not

231. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 609. The court, however, stated that it agreed with the Third
Circuit's decision in United States v. Parson, which held that the Sentencing Commission, despite
its stated intent, actually expanded the definition of crime of violence when it amended the
section in 1989. Id. (citing United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also supra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of the Sentencing Guidelines'
definition of crime of violence).
232. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 610; see also Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222-23
(10th Cir. 2001); supra notes 147-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's
determination in Tapia Garcia that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b)). The court also
refused to follow the Eleventh Circuit's determination that a DUI-related offense is a crime of
violence under § 16(a). Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 610; see also Le v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 196 F.3d
1352, 1354 (11 th Cir. 1999); see supra note 21 (describing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Le).
233. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied,
262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001); see also supra notes 173-201 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Chapa-Garza).
234. Parson,955 F.2d 858; see also supra note 195 (noting that the Third Circuit's analysis in
Parson distinguished between "use of force" and "risk of physical injury").
235. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 610-11;U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4B1.2(1)(ii) (2001). As noted above, both the Seventh Circuit and the Third Circuit held that
DUI is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Rutherford, 54
F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995); Parson, 955 F.2d at 858; see also supra notes 195 & 205 (discussing
the distinction between risking the "use of force" and risking physical injury).
236. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 611 (citing Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 372-73).
237. Id.
238. Id. In addition, the court noted that intentional force used by the offenders to open the
car door or press the accelerator "does not constitute the use of physical force as required by [§
16(b)]" because the "physical force" used must be "actual violent force." Id. (following
Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2000)).
239. Id. at 612.
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have as an element the intentional use of force, as required under §
16(a), but does involve a substantial risk that intentional force may be
used in the course of committing that offense, as required under §
16(b). 240 Applying its interpretation of § 16(b) to the offenses at issue
in Bazan-Reyes, the court held that none of the offenses were crimes of
violence under § 16(b), because offenders rarely intentionally use force
24 1
to commit them.
3. Dalton v. Ashcroft: The Second Circuit Holds that a DUI Offender
does not "Use" Force Within the Meaning of § 16(b)
In Dalton v. Ashcroft,24 2 the Second Circuit held that DUI is not a
crime of violence under § 16(b) because DUI presents a risk of an
ensuing accident, not the risk that the offender will use force in the
course of committing the crime. 243 Like the Seventh and Fifth Circuits,
the court focused on an intent requirement implied by § 16(b)'s
inclusion of the verb "use.'244 In Dalton, the court reviewed the BIA's
determination that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b). 245 The
court reviewed de novo the BIA's interpretation of § 16, applying
Chevron deference only to the BIA's interpretation of the INA.24 6 In
addition, the court applied the categorical approach in whether an
offense is a crime of violence under § 16.247

240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir.) (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001)).
242. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001).
243. Id. at 206.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 202. In Dalton, the alien, a Canadian citizen, pled guilty to DUI. Id. The statute
provides, in relevant part, that "no person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated
condition." N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.3 (McKinney 1996)). The conviction at issue
became a felony under New York law because the alien had two prior convictions within the ten
years preceding the third conviction. Id. at 205 & n.7; see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1193.1(c)(ii) (McKinney 2002). The INS initiated removal proceedings against the alien and
ordered the alien removed. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203. The alien appealed this decision to the BIA,
which affirmed the alien's removal order. Id.
246. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203 (citing Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir.
2000)). The court first determined that it retained jurisdiction to determine whether the alien
committed an "aggravated felony" despite the recent amendments limiting judicial review of final
orders of removal against aliens removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2000)); see also supra note 70 (discussing recent
amendments to the INA limiting judicial review of orders removing aliens convicted of an
aggravated felony).
247. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 204; see also supra note 36 (discussing the categorical approach of
statutory interpretation).
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The court held that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b),
because crime of violence is defined in terms of real, substantial risks,
not by hypothetical harms. 24 8 Quoting the New York Court of Appeals,
the court noted that the New York DUI statute at issue is sweeping and
broad. 249 The court held that, under this DUI statute, a defendant could
be convicted even when there is no risk that the offender will use force
or that an injury may result.25 0 The court relied on several New York
cases establishing that the DUI statute criminalized conduct that did not
present a risk that the25 1offender would use force in the course of
committing the offense.
The court then held that a drunk driver does not risk the "use" of
force within the meaning of § 16(b) because a drunk driver does not risk
the intentional use of force, but risks an unintentional accident.2 5 2 The
court emphasized that the risk inherent in the offense of DUI is not the
risk that the offender will "use physical force" in the course of driving,
but the risk of an ensuing accident. 253 The court stated that interpreting
the phrase "use of physical force" to include an accidental collision
distorts the English language. 254 The court also found that the minimal
force necessary to operate a vehicle, such as maneuvering the steering
wheel, does not satisfy § 16(b). 255 The court reasoned that such an
interpretation of force would make any felony that involves driving a
crime of violence under § 16(b). 256
The court compared the definition of crime of violence under § 16(b)
with the definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing
Guidelines,257 highlighting the difference between the phrases "risk of
injury 258 and a risk of the "use of physical force" under § 16(b).2 59
248. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 206.
249. Id. at 205 (quoting People v. Prescott, 745 N.E.2d 1000 (N.Y. 2001)).
250. Id.
251. Id. (citing Prescott, 745 N.E.2d 1000 (holding that a person can be found guilty under the
statute without knowing how to operate the vehicle); People v. David W., 442 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that a vehicle does not need to be operable in order to obtain a
conviction under the statute); People v. Marriot, 325 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971)
(holding that a person can be convicted under the statute when he is asleep at the wheel, the
engine is not running, and the vehicle never moved)).
252. Id. at 206.
253. Id.
254. Id. For example, the court noted that a drunk driver who causes an accident did not
"use" force in the same way that one might intentionally use force to pry open a jammed door.
Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a)(2) (2001).
258. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 207.
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Noting that the Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in
Rutherford,2 6 ° the court stated that "use of physical force" is not the
same as "risk of injury." 26 1 The court held that the difference between
"risk of injury" and risk of the "use of physical force" is significant
because there are crimes that involve a substantial risk of injury to
others but do not involve the use of force by the offender. 262 Following
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Chapa-Garza,263 the court stated that the
Sentencing Commission's revision of the Sentencing Guidelines'
definition of crime of violence 264 counsels against interpreting the
words "use of physical force" in the same way as the phrase "risk of
265
injury.
The court refused to follow the Tenth Circuit's decision in Tapia
Garcia for two reasons. 266 First, the Tenth Circuit applied Chevron
deference to the BIA's interpretation of § 16.267 As noted above, the
Second Circuit did not apply Chevron deference to the BIA's
interpretation of crime of violence under § 16 because the BIA was not
interpreting the INA, the statute that it administers. 268 Next, the Second
Circuit found the reasoning underlying the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Tapia Garcia unpersuasive. 269 The Dalton court disagreed with the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the definitions of crime of violence
under § 16 and the Sentencing Guidelines were "functionally
similar." 270 The court noted that the Tenth Circuit cited United States v.
27 ' in support of this proposition.2 72 The court read
Coronado-Cervantes
259. Id.
260. United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995); see also supra note 205
(discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rutherford).
261. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 207.
262. Id. By way of illustration, the court noted that "[c]rimes of gross negligence or reckless
endangerment, such as leaving an infant near a pool, involve a risk of injury without the use of
force." Id.
263. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied,
262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001); see also supra notes 173-201 and accompanying text (discussing
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Chapa-Garza).
264. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the changes made in the
definition of crime of violence in the Sentencing Guidelines); see also Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at
926 (noting the differences between § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence and the Sentencing
Guidelines' definition).
265. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 207 (citing Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 926).
266. Id. at 208 n.9.
267. Id.
268. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing the Dalton court's limitation of
Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation of the INA).
269. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 208 n.9.
270. Id.
271. United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998).
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the Coronado-Cervantesdecision as establishing nothing more than the
proposition that "where there is the risk of use of force, there is the risk
of injury." 273 The Dalton court stated that, from this proposition, it does
not necessarily follow that all offenses that involve a risk of injury also
involve the use of force. 274 The court reasoned that just because DUI
involves a risk of injury, it does not follow that DUI also involves a risk
of the use of force within the meaning of § 16(b). 2 75 The court
concluded by acknowledging that drunk driving has taken a tremendous
toll on human life, but argued that by "shoehorning" the offense of DUI
to include it, courts risk usurping
into criminal statutes not designed
276
roles.
legislative
state
federal and
4. United States v. Trinidad-Aquino:The Ninth Circuit Holds that DUI
Based on "Negligence" is not a Crime of Violence Under § 16
In United States v. Trinidad-Aquino,277 the Ninth Circuit held that
DUI with bodily injury is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) when
the defendant can be convicted of the offense with a negligent mens
rea. 278 The court held that § 16(b)'s inclusion of the word "use"

272. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 208 n.9.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 208. Judge Walker dissented, opining that the majority incorrectly applied the
categorical approach and argued for a broader, common sense definition of crime of violence that
takes into account the risks associated with the criminal conduct. Id. at 209 (Walker, C.J.,
dissenting). Judge Walker reasoned that the risk of injury to others from the use of force by
drunk drivers was the impetus for legislation criminalizing DUI. Id. (Walker, C.J., dissenting).
Judge Walker would have held that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b) because, even
assuming that the word "use" implies intentional availment, the offense of DUI involves the
intentional use of force by the offender. Id. at 209-10 (Walker, C.J., dissenting). Judge Walker
stated that because the offender intends to use mechanized force to propel the vehicle, that force
does not stop being "used" if the offender causes an accident. Id. at 209 (Walker, C.J.,
dissenting). Judge Walker reasoned that the simple act of driving involves some risk that
"'physical force may be used against the person or property of another,"' and the fact that a driver
is drunk makes that risk "'substantial"' within the meaning of § 16(b). Id. at 209-10 (Walker,
C.J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Walker opined that the fact that the New York law requires two
prior convictions in order to constitute a felony necessitates holding that the offense is a crime of
violence under § 16(b). Id. at 210 (Walker, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "the risk that injury will
occur on one of three occasions is greater than on any one occasion considered alone"). The
increased risk associated with three offenses made the third offense one that "by its nature"
involves a substantial risk that the offender will use force. Id. (Walker, C.J., dissenting).
277. United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).
278. Id. at 1146; see also supra note 46 (discussing and defining mens rea and the various
levels of mens rea). In two prior decisions, the Ninth Circuit held that an offense requiring a
"reckless" mens rea could be a crime of violence under § 16. See Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000).
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required a defendant to engage in some volitional conduct and that
merely negligent conduct did not satisfy this requirement. 279 The court
distinguished prior decisions holding that offenses requiring "reckless"
mens rea could be crimes of violence under § 16(b). 280 The court stated
that reckless or criminally negligent acts involve some volitional
conduct on the part of the offender, thus satisfying § 16(b)'s
requirement that the offender risk the "use" of force. 281 Judge Kozinski
dissented, arguing that the court's decision in Trinidad-Aquino
conflicted with prior precedent that established that reckless or
criminally negligent conduct satisfied § 16(b)'s definition of crime of
282
violence.
In Trinidad-Aquino, the alien had been convicted of DUI with bodily
injury under California law. 283 He was subsequently convicted of
illegally re-entering the United States following removal.2 84 The district
court did not apply an increased sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines,285 finding that the defendant's prior DUI conviction was not
an aggravated felony triggering the increased sentence. 286
The

In Ceron-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit held that an offense based on reckless conduct could be a
crime of violence under § 16(b) where the offense poses a substantial risk that physical force may
be used against another. See Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1173. The court held that attempted
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, an Arizona felony, is a crime
of violence under § 16(a) and § 16(b). Id. at 1172-73. The court emphasized that a "dangerous
instrument" as defined under Arizona law must be "'readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury' under the circumstances in which it is used. See id. at 1172 (quoting ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-105(8)).
In Park, the Ninth Circuit held that involuntary manslaughter, an offense based on "criminally
negligent" conduct, could be a crime of violence under § 16(b). Park, 252 F.3d at 1022. The
definition of "criminal negligence" at issue in Park was substantially similar to the definition of
"recklessness" at issue in Ceron-Sanchez. Id. at 1024-25.
279. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1145.
280. Id. at 1145-46.
281. Id. at 1146.
282. Id. at 1147-48 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 1142. The alien had also been convicted of "hit and run resulting in death or
injury" under California Vehicle Code § 20001. Id. This conviction, however, was not at issue
in this case "[blecause the government did not pursue its argument under the hit and run statute
on appeal." Id. The DUI statute under which the alien was convicted provided, in relevant part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of any alcoholic beverage
or drug, or under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a
vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law, or neglect any duty imposed by
law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any
person other than the driver.
Id. at 1143 (quoting CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153(a) (West 2000)).
284. Id. at 1142 (violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000)).
285. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2001).
286. Trinidad-Aquino,259 F.3d at 1142.
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government appealed the district court's decision not to increase the
defendant's sentence, arguing that the alien's DUI conviction was a
crime of violence and, thus, an aggravated felony. 287 Reviewing the
district court's decision de novo, the Ninth Circuit held that the alien's
prior DUI conviction was not a crime of violence under § 16(b) and,
thus was not an aggravated felony subjecting the alien to an increased
288
sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines.
The court applied the categorical approach 289 and first found that
negligent conduct could support a conviction under the California DUI
statute at issue. 290 The court then characterized the issue before it as
whether negligent conduct satisfies § 16(b)'s definition of crime of
violence. 29 1 The government argued that the court's prior decision in
Ceron-Sanchez was controlling and that the court should extend this
holding to cover negligent conduct as well.29 2 The court rejected the
government's arguments, finding that § 16(b) requires volitional
conduct, which is not present when a defendant acts with a mens rea of
negligence.

293

The court held that § 16(b)'s requirement that there be a risk that the
offender "use" force required some volitional conduct on the part of the
offender. 294 In support of its holding that the verb "use" implies some
volitional
conduct, the court referred to the dictionary definition of
"use." 295 The court noted that the ordinary understanding of the verb

287. Id.
288. Id. at 1146.
289. See supra note 36 (discussing the categorical approach to statutory interpretation as used
by the BIA in § 16 cases). In addition, the court noted that it had "developed two alternative
methodologies for defining... 'aggravated felonies."' Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1143. The
Ninth Circuit has developed two methods of applying the categorical approach. Id. One method
is to look to the ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute that the offender had been convicted
under. Id. (citing United States v. Baron-Median, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999)). The
other method is to look to the common law for a "uniform definition" of the offense. Id. at 114344 (citing Yea v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)). In this case, the court decided to
look to the ordinary meaning of the language defining crime of violence because crime of
violence is not a traditional common law crime. Id. at 1144.
290. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1143.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1144.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1144-45.
295. See id. at 1145 & n.2 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1966 (3d ed. 1992); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990); THE
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2523-24 (1986)). The definitions of
"use" relied upon were: "To make use of, to convert to one's service; to employ; to avail oneself
of; to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action by means of; to put into action or service, especially
to attain an end." Id. at 1145 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)). "'To put
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"use" implies some volitional conduct on the part of the "user" and that
296
one cannot "use" force within the meaning of § 16(b) negligently.
Interpreting § 16(b)'s requirement that physical force be used against
another, the court concluded that it is inaccurate to say that an offender
is volitionally using physical force during a DUI offense when the
person and did not consciously
offender did not intend to hit the other
297
disregard the risk that he may do so.
The court then attempted to reconcile its holding that negligent
conduct does not satisfy § 16(b) with its prior holdings that criminally
negligent or reckless conduct satisfies § 16(b)'s definition of crime of
violence. 298 The court stated that its holding in Trinidad-Aquino did not
affect these prior decisions. 299 Specifically, the court stated that an
offender cannot commit a crime of violence under § 16(b) if he
negligently, as opposed to intentionally or recklessly, hits the person or
property of another. 30 0 Drawing on the definition of "recklessness"
under the Model Penal Code,3 0 1 the court held that recklessness requires
the conscious disregard of a risk of harm of which the offender is
aware. 302 The court stated that this conscious disregard of a risk of
harm is a volitional component, not present when an offender acts
30 3
negligently.
The court noted that its decision was consistent with the holdings of
the other circuits that had substantively considered the mens rea

required by § 16(b), but specified that it did not follow the Rutherford

To avail oneself of; practice."' Id. at 1145 n.2
into service or apply for a purpose, employ ......
(quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1966 (3d ed.
to carry out a purpose or action by
employ, .....
1992)). "'[T]o put into action or service, .....
means of."' Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2523-24
(1986)).
296. Id. at 1145.
297. See id. at 1145-46.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1145.
301. The Model Penal Code defines "recklessness" as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (official draft and revised comments 1985); see also supra note
46 (discussing mens rea, the Model Penal Code, and the different levels of mens rea).
302. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.
303. Id.
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and Parson decisions in requiring that the offender have specific intent
to use force. 30 4 The court emphasized that, under its analysis, § 16(b)
requires a volitional act at least equivalent to recklessness. 30 5 The court
acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit held that DUI is a crime of
violence under § 16(b), but refused to follow that court, noting that the
language in § 16(b)
Tenth Circuit had not addressed whether the "use"
3 6
requires a volitional act on the part of the offender. 0
IV.

ANALYSIS

Although DUI certainly involves a risk that an accident will occur as
a result of the crime, it simply does not fit into the definition of crime of
violence under § 16(b). 30 7 The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
correctly determined that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b)
because a drunk driver will rarely, if ever, risk "using" force in the
course of committing the offense. 30 8 The Ninth Circuit also correctly
held that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b), but it incorrectly
held that offenses risking the reckless application of force may be
304. Id. (citing United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 925-27 (5th Cir.) (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 371-74
(7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also supra note
46 (defining "specific intent" and "general intent").
305. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.
306. Id. (citing Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001)). Judge Kozinski
dissented, stating that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b) because the statute does not
punish simple negligent conduct, but punishes negligent acts committed while a driver is legally
intoxicated. Id. at 1147 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). For Judge Kozinski, the California DUI statute
does not punish merely the negligent acts of the driver, but also the reckless conduct of drinking
and driving that causes the negligence. See id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). He emphasized the
dangers of drunk driving and the vastly increased chances that the offender will commit a
negligent act resulting in injury to another. Id. at 1147-48 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge
Kozinski also opined that the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions in Ceron-Sanchez and Park cannot
be distinguished and should control the outcome in Trinidad-Aquino. Id. at 1147 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). He noted that it is unlikely that California's criminal statutes require a mens rea less
than criminal negligence, and thus the DUI offense would fall under Park's holding that "criminal
negligence" satisfies § 16(b). Id. at 1147 n.* (Kozinski, J., dissenting). He characterized the
majority opinion's emphasis on § 16(b)'s "use" requirement as "nit-picking the words of [§1 16 in
a futile effort to distinguish" the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions. Id. at 1147 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
307. See, e.g., Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cit. 2001).
308. Id. (holding that a New York conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated is not a
conviction of a crime of violence under § 16); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that an Indiana conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Wisconsin
conviction for homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, and an Illinois conviction for driving
under the influence are not convictions for "crimes of violence" under § 16); United States v.
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that a Texas conviction for driving
while intoxicated is not a conviction of a crime of violence under § 16), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d
479 (5th Cir. 2001).
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crimes of violence under § 16(b). 309 Burglary is an excellent example
of the type of offense that § 16(b) covers. 3 10 In contrast, the definition
of crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines provides a superb
example of a definition of crime of violence that includes DUI. 3 11
A. DUI is not a Crime of Violence Because the Drunk Driver does not
Risk the Intentional Use of Force

DUI is not the type of offense that presents a substantial risk that the
3 12
offender will use force against another in order to complete the crime.
Rather, DUI involves a risk that an accident causing injury to others will
occur as a result of the offense. 313 As the Second, Fifth, and Seventh

Circuits correctly determined, DUI is not a crime of violence under §
16(b) because a drunk driver does not risk "using" force in the course of
committing the offense. 3 14 These Courts of Appeals correctly
determined that the inclusion of the verb "use" in § 16(b)'s definition
implies the intentional application of force. 3 15 These courts also
correctly determined that the offenses that § 16(b) is designed to cover
are those offenses in which the elements reveal that the offender is
willing to risk the intentional use of force against the person or property
of another. 3 16 Section 16(b)'s requirement that the offender risk "using"
force covers only those offenses in which the offender risks
3 17
intentionally using force against the person or property of another.
3 18
The verb "use" implies volitional conduct on the part of the offender.
309. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1145.
310. See United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1313 (4th Cir. 1993).
311. See United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1992).
312. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 207.
313. Id.
314. See id. at 208; Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001);
see also supra notes 173-276 (discussing the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit opinions holding
that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16).
315. See, e.g., Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 611 (holding that, in order to be a crime of violence
under § 16(b), the offender must risk intentionally availing himself of the use of force); In re
Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517, slip op. at 24 (B.I.A. Sept. 29,
1999) (Rosenberg, dissenting), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/
Revdec/pdfDEC/3412.pdf.
316. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 206 (holding that DUI is not a crime of violence because a drunk
driver does not risk the intentional use of force); Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 611 (holding that, in
order to be a crime of violence under § 16(b), the offender must risk intentionally availing himself
of the use of force); Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924 (holding that, in order to commit a crime of
violence under § 16, an offender must recklessly risk the intentional use of force).
317. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 207-08 (holding that a New York conviction for operating a
vehicle while intoxicated is not a conviction of a crime of violence under § 16).
318. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 608.

20021

DUI as a Crime of Violence

Simply put, one does not "use" anything unintentionally. 319 In addition,
the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits' determination that "use"
implies intentional availment is in accord with the 0Supreme Court's
32
determination that "use" suggests intentional conduct.
The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits correctly identified burglary,
an offense mentioned in the legislative history of the term "crime of
violence,"' 32 1 as an example of the kind of offense that meets § 16(b)'s
definition of crime of violence. 322 A burglar must be prepared to use
force should he discover the occupant of the dwelling during the course
of the burglary. 323 As the United States Supreme Court explained in
Taylor v. United States, the offense of burglary is dangerous because of
the risk that the offender may discover someone in the dwelling during
324
the burglary and respond with intentional force against that person.
325
This is exactly the type of offense that § 16(b)'s definition covers.
Another example of an offense that properly falls within the definition
of crime of violence under § 16(b) is the offense of indecency with a
child involving sexual contact, mentioned by the Fifth Circuit in ChapaGarza.326 This offense is a crime of violence under § 16(b) because the
offender may find it necessary to use physical force against the child in
327
order to force the child to comply with the sexual contact.
In contrast to these offenses, DUI does not present a danger that a
drunk driver will use force in order to complete the crime.3 28 DUI is
dangerous because a drunk driver is more likely to collide with
pedestrians or other vehicles, causing an accident. 329 In the terms of the
Sentencing Guidelines' definition of crime of violence, DUI presents a
319. See id.; contra Chapa-Garza,262 F.3d at 482 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (stating that
"force may be used accidentally").
320. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993) (quoting dictionary definitions
of "use" suggesting intentional conduct is implied by the term).
321. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 307 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486-87.
322. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing the inclusion of burglary as an
example of a crime of violence in the legislative history of the term "crime of violence").
323. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG,
supra note 37, § 7:28, at 7-100 n.34; see also supra note 42 (discussing the Supreme Court's
treatment of the offense of burglary).
324. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 585.
325. See KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 37, § 7:28, at 7-100 n.34.
326. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (citing United
States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418, 422 (5th Cit. 1996)), reh'g denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th
Cir. 2001).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See id. Cf.Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (citing statistics
demonstrating the number of alcohol-related accidents).
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"risk of physical injury." 330 DUI does not, in § 16(b)'s terms, present a
33
risk that force will be "used."- 1
In addition, DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because any
force risked as a result of driving under the influence is not used "in the
course of committing the offense," as § 16(b) requires. 332 Any risk of
force that DUI presents is a risk that there will be a collision as a result
of the offense. 333 It cannot be said that a drunk driver uses force in
committing the offense when the drunk driver causes an accident,
334
which, in turn, causes violent force.
B. The Ninth CircuitIncorrectly Determined that § 16(b) Includes
Offenses Presentingthe Risk of Reckless Force
The Ninth Circuit correctly determined that DUI is not a crime of
violence under § 16(b), but for the wrong reasons. 335 The court
recognized that the verb "use" in § 16(b) requires some volitional
conduct. 336 The court erred, however, when it attempted to find that the
risk of volitional use of force could occur due to recklessness. 337 The
Ninth Circuit stated that DUI could be a crime of violence when the
offender recklessly or intentionally risks "hitting" another object.33 8
The court failed to recognize that risking recklessly hitting another with
an automobile is not the same as risking the "use of force" as § 16(b)
requires. The offender's conscious disregard of the risk of an accident
does not transform the DUI into an offense that presents a risk that the
offender will intentionally use force within the meaning of § 16(b).339
The Ninth Circuit strained to distinguish its decision in Trinidad-Aquino
from its prior precedent establishing that an offender can risk the
reckless use of force within the meaning of § 16(b). 340 This reasoning is
not persuasive because, in the context of DUI, the offender consciously
disregards the risk that an accident might occur.34 1 The offender does

330. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(l)(ii) (2001).
331. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000).
332. Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001).
333. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 927.
334. Id.
335. United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2001).
336. Id. at 1144-45.
337. Id. at 1145-46.
338. Id. at 1145.
339. Cf. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 927 (stating that the risk of a collision is not the risk that
the drunk driver will use force).
340. See Trinidad-Aquino,259 F.3d at 1146.
341. See Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 927.
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not consciously disregard the risk that he may need to use physical force
in order to perpetrate the crime, as § 16(b) requires. 34 2 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit's argument that recklessness can satisfy § 16(b) should be
rejected.
C. The Tenth Circuitand the BIA Incorrectly Determined that DUI is a
Crime of Violence Under § 16(b)
DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because a drunk driver
343
does not risk the use of force in the course of committing the offense.
The Tenth Circuit and the BIA misinterpreted § 16(b)'s definition by
holding that a drunk driver risks "using" force within the meaning of §
16(b). 344 The Tenth Circuit and the BIA improperly equated the risk
that an accident will result with the risk that an offender will use force
to commit the crime. 34 5 The Tenth Circuit relied on the fact that DUI is
inherently dangerous when it held that DUI is a crime of violence under
§ 16(b). 346 The Tenth Circuit mistakenly concluded that DUI is a crime
of violence based on the inherent danger involved in DUI.34 7 While
DUI certainly is dangerous and presents a risk that an accident or
physical harm will result from the offense, DUI rarely, if ever, presents
a risk that the drunk driver will "use" force. 34 8 Also, the Tenth Circuit
improperly relied on prior precedent applying the Sentencing
Guidelines' materially different definition of crime of violence when it
interpreted § 16(b). 349 The Tenth Circuit relied on these cases despite
the fact that it recognized that the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of
crime of violence differs from § 16(b)'s definition. 35 0 The Tenth Circuit
regarded the different wording of the two definitions as unimportant.35 1
The court failed to discern the important differences in the two
342. Id.
343. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2001).
344. Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec.
No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3412.pdf; In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No.
3341, File No. A90 219 200 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/
bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf.
345. See In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 6; see generally Tapia
Garcia,237 F.3d at 1222; In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 10-12.
346. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222-23.
347. Id.
348. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied,
262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001).
349. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222-23 (relying on cases applying the Sentencing Guidelines'
definition of crime of violence).
350. Id.
351. Id.
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definitions. DUI is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines
because that definition requires a "risk of physical harm." 352 DUI,
however, is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because § 16(b)
353
requires that the offender risk the "use" of force.
In addition, the Tenth Circuit relied on the BIA's decision in In re
Puente-Salazar354 to support its finding that DUI is a crime of violence
under § 16(b).3 55 However, the Tenth Circuit's reliance is misplaced
because the BIA also failed to properly distinguish between the risk of
physical harm and the risk that an offender will use force. 356 In one
telling excerpt from the BIA's decision in In re Magallanes-Garcia,the
BIA held that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b) because it
involves a "substantial risk of harm to persons and property."357 The
BIA attempted to clarify this holding in its decision in In re PuenteSalazar,3 5 8 but the language that the BIA used in In re MagallanesGarcia is significant because the BIA explicitly equated "risk of harm"
with the requirement in § 16(b) that there be a risk that physical force is
used.359 The BIA improperly based its initial determination that DUI is
a crime of violence under § 16(b) on its finding that DUI involves an
inherent risk of harm to others, even though § 16(b) requires that the
offense present a risk that force will be used against the person or
property of another. 360 The BIA's later attempt, in In re PuenteSalazar, to clarify this holding is also unpersuasive. 36 1 In In re PuenteSalazar, the BIA attempted to argue that DUI is a crime of violence
under § 16(b) because there is a causal link between the potential for
harm it had recognized in In re Magallanes-Garciaand the risk of the
use of force. 362 This reasoning is still not persuasive because the BIA
352. Cf. United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.2).
353. 18 U.S.C. §§ 16(a), (b) (2000).
354. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, File No. A36 582 517 (B.I.A. Sept. 29,
1999), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3412.pdf.
355. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1222 (citing In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412).
356. In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 22-23 n.5.
357. In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Dec. No. 3341, File No. A90 219 200, slip op. at 6
(B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/
pdfDEC/3341 .pdf (emphasis added).
358. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (analyzing the BIA's discussion of In re
Magallanes-Garciain the In re Puente-Salazardecision).
359. In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 22-23 n.5 (Rosenberg,
dissenting).
360. In re Magallanes-Garcia,Interim Dec. No. 3341, slip op. at 6 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoirlefoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3341 .pdf.
361. See In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec. No. 3412.
362. Id. slip op. at 12-13.
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failed to address the implications of § 16(b)'s inclusion of the verb
"use." Even though DUI presents a potential for harm that is causally
linked with the "force" of an accident, it does not follow that the DUI
offender risks the use of force as required by § 16(b).
Finally, both the Tenth Circuit and the BIA failed to take into account
§ 16(b)'s requirement that the use of force be risked in the course of
committing the offense. 363 The requirement that force be used in the
course of committing the offense suggests that the force must be used
during the offense or in order to complete the offense. 364 DUI does not
present a risk that force will be used in the course of committing the
offense; rather DUI presents a risk that force may result from the
commission of the offense. 365 In holding that DUI is a crime of
violence under § 16(b), the Tenth Circuit and the BIA failed to discern
this distinction.
Because DUI does not present a risk that the offender will
intentionally use force against the person or property of another in the
course of committing the offense, DUI is not a crime of violence under
§ 16(b).3 66 The inclusion of the verb "use" in § 16(b)'s definition
reveals Congress' intent to cover conduct, like burglary, that presents a
risk that the offender will use intentional force against another. 36 7 The
Ninth Circuit incorrectly held that § 16(b) covers the reckless
application of force against the person or property of another. 368 The
Tenth Circuit and the BIA improperly held that DUI is a crime of
violence under § 16(b) because they equated the risk of harm created by

363. Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Puente-Salazar,Interim Dec.
No. 3412.
364. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied,
262 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Dec. No. 3412, slip op. at 30
(Rosenberg, dissenting).
365. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924.
366. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
California conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol with injury to another is not a
conviction of a crime of violence under § 16); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that a New York conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated is not a conviction
of a crime of violence under § 16); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that an Indiana conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Wisconsin conviction for
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, and an Illinois conviction for driving under the
influence were not convictions for "crimes of violence" under § 16); Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d 921
(5th Cir.) (holding that Texas conviction for driving while intoxicated is not a conviction of a
crime of violence under § 16).
367. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 200 (holding that a New York conviction for operating a vehicle
while intoxicated is not a conviction of a crime of violence under § 16).
368. See Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1140.
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DUI with § 16(b)'s requirement that the offender risk the use of
force.

36 9

V. PROPOSAL

Since the Tenth Circuit's decision in Tapia Garcia,370 four Courts of
Appeals have held that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b). 37 '
The weight of authority now clearly goes against the Tenth Circuit's
determination that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b). Thus, the
Tenth Circuit should consider revisiting the issue in light of the recent
decisions. In addition, the BIA should acquiesce to the Second, Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits' determination that DUI is not a crime of
violence under § 16(b). In the event that the BIA and the Tenth Circuit
cling to their determination that DUI is a crime of violence under §
16(b), the United States Supreme Court should resolve the split by
determining that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b). In
addition, Congress could amend § 16 and specify whether DUI and
related offenses are crimes of violence under § 16.
A. The Tenth Circuit Should Revisit the Issue
and the BIA and INS Should Acquiesce and Cease
Removing Aliens Convicted of Felony DUI
The clear weight of authority now goes against the Tenth Circuit's
determination that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b). Since the
Tenth Circuit decided Tapia Garcia,37 2 four circuits have determined
that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b).37 3 These decisions,
374
with the exception of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Trinidad-Aquino,
are more persuasive in their treatment of this issue.
Particularly persuasive is the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits'
determination that the verb "use" in § 16(b) implies that the offender
must risk intentionally using force in the course of committing the

369. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 606-07.
370. Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2001).
371. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146; Dalton, 257 F.3d at 208; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at
611; Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924.
372. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222-23.
373. See supra note 366 (discussing the Courts of Appeals post-Tapia Garcia decisions
holding that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b)). In addition, the Third Circuit has
stated in dicta that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b). See United States v. Parson, 955
F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992).
374. Trinidad-Aquino,259 F.3d at 1140.
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offense. 37 5 As the Second Circuit correctly recognized in Dalton, one
does not "use" violent physical force in an automobile accident. 376 In
contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Tapia Garcia failed to inquire into the
meaning and implications of the word "use" in § 16(b)'s definition of
crime of violence. 377 The Tenth Circuit's determination that DUI is a
crime of violence under § 16(b) stands in the way of the uniform
implementation of the nation's immigration laws. 378 Given the stakes,
the Tenth Circuit should revisit the issue of whether DUI is a crime of
violence under § 16(b), concentrating on whether § 16(b)'s inclusion of
the verb "use" implies that the offender must risk the intentional use of
force.
In addition, the BIA should cease removing aliens convicted of
felony DUI. The BIA has already determined that it will no longer
remove aliens convicted of felony DUI from the Fifth Circuit. 379 The
BIA should correspondingly decide to cease removing aliens convicted
of DUI from the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. In order to insure
the uniform implementation of the nation's immigration laws, the BIA
should go further and altogether cease removing aliens solely for felony
DUI convictions.
B. The Supreme Court Should Resolve the Split
If the BIA and the INS refuse to acquiesce to the definition of crime
of violence advanced by the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits, then the United States Supreme Court should resolve the
circuit split. The Supreme Court should follow the interpretation of
crime of violence advanced by these circuits and hold that DUI is not a
crime of violence under § 16. As argued above, the Second, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits' determinations that DUI is not a crime of violence is

375. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (discussing the Second, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits' determination that § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence requires that the offense
present a risk of the intentional use of force).
376. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 206.
377. See generally Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1216.
378. Cf United States v. Chapa-Garza, 262 F.3d 479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting).
379. See In re Olivares-Martinez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 148, 149, 150 (B.I.A. 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3453.pdf ("The Board
historically follows a court's precedent in cases arising in that circuit .... Accordingly, we will
not apply our decision in [In re Puente-Salazar], in cases arising within the jurisdiction of the
Fifth Circuit.").
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more persuasive than the Tenth Circuit's determination that DUI is a
380
crime of violence.
If the issue should reach the Supreme Court on an appeal from the
BIA, the Supreme Court does not owe Chevron deference 381 to the BIA
on this issue. 382 The BIA is not entitled to deference because § 16 is an
independent federal statute, not a part of the immigration laws that the
BIA administers. 383 The Supreme Court should review de novo the
BIA's determination that DUI is a crime of violence, draw on the
analysis of the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, and hold that DUI is
not a crime of violence under § 16. The Supreme Court should follow
the reasoning of those Courts of Appeals and hold that the inclusion of
the verb "use" in § 16(b)'s definition implies that an offender must risk
384
"intentional availment" of force.
C. Congress Should Amend § 16 to Specify the Level of Mens Rea
Necessary to Commit a Crime of Violence
In the event that the Tenth Circuit does not revisit the issue and the
United States Supreme Court does not chose to resolve it, then Congress
should consider amending § 16(b) by specifying what level of mens rea
is required in order to commit a crime of violence. In the alternative,
Congress could amend the definition of a crime of violence to
specifically include or exclude DUI and related offenses. Finally, if
Congress is solely concerned with the impact that this issue has on the
area of immigration law, Congress could amend the definition of
"aggravated felony" by specifying that DUI is, or is not, included in that
385
definition.

380. See supra notes 307-69 and accompanying text (arguing that the Second, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits correctly determined that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b)).
381. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see supra
note 65 (discussing the BIA and when courts owe it Chevron deference).
382. See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2001); Crawford & Hutchins, supra
note 35, at 78-79.
383. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203.
384. Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rutherford, 54
F.3d 370, 372-73 (7th Cir. 1995).
385. A simple clause within 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) providing that a state conviction for DUI is
not an "aggravated felony" would resolve the issue in the area of immigration law, which is
where the current controversy is centered. This addition would advance the uniform
implementation of the nation's immigration laws with respect to whether or not a DUI conviction
subjects an alien to deportation. If Congress does amend either § 16(b)'s definition of crime of
violence or the definition of "aggravated felony," Congress should be careful to take into account
the effect the amendment will have on many of the statutes that incorporate those definitions by
reference.
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VI. CONCLUSION

There is widespread agreement that DUI is a serious offense that
exacts a large human and financial toll on society. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that the offense fits into the definition of
crime of violence under § 16(b). Section 16(b)'s definition suggests
that an offense is a crime of violence when the offender risks using
intentional force on another in the course of committing the offense.
DUI simply does not fit into this definition of crime of violence. The
Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits correctly determined that DUI is not
a crime of violence under § 16(b) because a drunk driver does not risk
the use of force in the course of committing the offense. The Tenth
Circuit and the BIA incorrectly conflated the risk of injury that DUI
presents with the risk of use of force, which § 16(b) requires. The
Tenth Circuit should revisit this issue and follow the courts that have
held that DUI is not a crime of violence under § 16(b). In addition, the
BIA should acquiesce and refrain from removing aliens convicted of
felony DUI.

